WHO IS AFRAID OF THE CHINESE?

The EU's Anti Subsidy Tariffs on Chinese BEVs

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Abstract

One year after the EU imposed large anti-subsidy tariffs on imports of Chinese battery electric vehicles (BEVs), tariffs appear to have had little impact. Imports into the EU have declined, but no more than in markets without tariff protection. Prices paid by EU consumers for Chinese BEVs have, if anything, fallen—mirroring price trends at the border and in other markets.

The most tangible effect of the EU's BEV tariffs may therefore be fiscal: they could generate up to €2 billion annually in revenue for the EU budget. Replacing tariffs with a minimum price commitment from Chinese exporters would be inefficient, as it would amount to an implicit transfer from European consumers to Chinese producers.

Meanwhile, EU exporters of BEVs are gaining market share in many countries without tariffs, and the EU continues to run a sizeable and growing export surplus in BEVs. This contrasts with the popular narrative that subsidized, technologically superior Chinese producers are displacing EU manufacturers.

Introduction

In 2024, the European Union imposed countervailing anti-subsidy duties (ASDs) on imports of battery electric vehicles (BEVs) from China. Preliminary tariff rates were announced in July, and definitive rates—valid for five years—were set in October 2024, ranging from 7% to 37%.[1]

The European Commission argues that the duties are consistent with WTO rules, as they are based on documented subsidies granted to Chinese producers. China has filed a WTO complaint, claiming flaws in the Commission's methodology; the case is still pending.

The BEV case is noteworthy for two reasons. First, it is the EU's first major "own initiative" action, launched without an industry complaint. Second, it is the first time trade defense instruments have been applied in a sector where the EU enjoys a strong trade surplus.

The tariffs cover imports worth €9–10 billion annually, making this the EU's second-largest trade defense case. Only the anti-dumping measures against Chinese photovoltaic (PV) panels in the early 2010s were larger, affecting €21 billion in imports, about 1% of extra-EU imports at the time (Gros and Rotondi 2025).[2]

This brief provides an early assessment of the impact of the BEV tariffs on import shares, prices, and tariff revenues. [3]

Ex ante studies (Felbermayr et al. 2024) predicted that the BEV tariffs would sharply reduce the market share of Chinese imports. With one year of data now available, it is possible to compare these forecasts to actual outcomes.

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[1] Gros and Hu 2025 analyze both the economic and legal dimensions of these tariffs.
[2] Tariff rates in the PV case averaged 47%, compared to 7–37% for BEVs. Following those measures, imports from China collapsed to a fraction of their 2011 value.
[3] Reuters 2025 had reported that Chinese producers had proposed to substitute the countervailing tariffs with a minimum price agreement. However, this proposal has not been accepted by the Commission.

One concern raised in the debate was that ASDs could raise consumer prices in the EU, thereby slowing the green transition in transport. However, this has not materialized. For most affected models, EU consumer prices have, if anything, declined since the tariffs took effect in 2024. This stands in contrast to the experience under the first Trump administration, when tariffs on Chinese imports translated almost one-for-one into higher consumer prices (Cavallo et al. 2021; Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal 2022).

We begin by presenting descriptive data that highlights the EU's sizeable trade surplus in BEVs and allows for a rough, top-down estimate of tariff revenues.

We then examine the (limited) impact of the tariffs on prices and import volumes, using other European markets without tariffs as comparators. A simple difference-in-differences (DiD) exercise corroborates these findings, suggesting that the burden of the tariffs has fallen almost entirely on producers.

Finally, we provide BEV model-level estimates of tariff revenues and conclude by emphasizing the growing success of EU producers in third-country markets where no tariff protection exists.

The EU has a large, and growing surplus in BEV trade

Table 1 below documents EU trade in BEVs, which is substantial. In 2023 imports of BEVs were worth 20 bn euro and exports 30 bn euro. In 2024 the value of trade fell somewhat in euro terms, but the surplus of the EU increased as imports from China stagnated while exports held up better. The value of EU BEV imported from China was running at about 9-10 bn euro p.a. over the last two years, but is now, on an annual basis, back to the 2022 level. For the last years somewhat more than one half of all extra-EU imports of BEVs came from China. That proportion has now fallen to about 40%.

The EU has always had a surplus in trade in BEV, increasing over time from 10 bn euro in 2022 about 16 bn on an annual basis in H12025. We report only the trade in values (bn euro). In terms of numbers of vehicles, trade is balanced as the EU imports about as many BEVs as it exports. The difference is of course due to the higher unit value of EU exports.

The main take away from this cursory examination of the EU trade in BEVs is that the EU has a large, and growing surplus in BEVs, which contradicts the prevailing narrative that the European automotive sector cannot survive without protection against state subsidized Chinese competition.

Table 1: EU BEV trade (in bn Euro)

	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025 H1
Exports	12,2	22,5	29,6	26,3	15,3
Imports, total	9,06	12,6	22,7	15,2	7,5
Imports from China	3,5	6,9	11,0	8,3	3,3
Balance	3,2	9,9	6,9	11,1	7,8

Source: Eurostat

The anti-subsidy tariff rates imposed in 2024 varied across producers, ranging from roughly 7% for Tesla and 35% for SAIC group (in which VW has a stake). The (unweighted) average is about 20%, implying that, based on 2024 figures, the potential tariff revenue should be about 2 bn euro p/a, or more than 1 % of the annual budget of the EU (running at 190bn euro in2024).[4]

We show below that this rough estimate of the potential tariff revenues holds up well even if one considers the large differences in tariff rates across different producers and their market shares.

Chinese BEV import prices did not increase with anti-subsidy tariffs

The official purpose of the anti-subsidy tariffs had been to offset the subsidies received by producers located in China (some EU owned Chinese producers were also subject to tariffs). The Commission investigation had implicitly alleged that the increase in the market share of Chinese-made cars achieved up to 2022 was due to the (alleged) subsidies that had allowed Chinese producers to sell at lower prices in the EU. The aim of the trade defense measure was to induce them to increase prices and/or reduce their exports to the EU, thus supporting EU-based production of BEVs.

Given the substantial tariffs in force since mid-2024, one would have expected a significant increase in prices and a reduction in demand by early 2025.

In principle one would expect that tariffs would lead to higher prices for consumers (thus reducing import demand) and lower import prices to the extent that foreign suppliers reduce their price (pre-tariff) prices in order to limit the loss of market share. This pattern could be observed when the first Trump administration in 2018 imposed tariffs on a range of Chinese goods. Consumer prices rose almost 1:1 with the tariffs, suggesting that Chinese exporters reduced their prices only minimally (Cavallo et al. 2021, Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal 2022). The average of this first wave of US China tariffs was about 20%, not far from the average value of the anti-subsidy tariffs on BEVs of the EU now.

Measuring the impact of the BEV countervailing duties on consumer prices is difficult because the rate is not the same for all importers of the product. The investigation of the Commission had found widely different rates of subsidization across different producers. Moreover, car prices can differ even for the same make and model because of differences in the exact specification and the inclusion of optional elements. There is no consumer price index of BEVs made in China.

Moreover, contrary to normal consumer goods, one cannot just visit a store to find the price because each model is slightly different. One thus has to compare carefully one by one prices for the same model before and after the tariffs were imposed. This was done for 3 of the 4 Chinese manufactures that had the highest duties assessed, namely BYD with a duty rate of 17% and the highest share of registration in the EU among Chinese producers, MG (SAIC group) with a duty of 35,3% and 13k registration in Q1 2025 in the EU, POLESTAR and VOLVO with a duty of 18.8%.

[4]This sum represents only the additional tariff income from the countervailing BEV tariffs. The EU has also a 10% tariff on all types of cars that is unaffected by the BEV tariffs. The 10% MFN car tariff should yield about 7.5 bn euro per annum given total extra-EU imports of cars of about 75 bn euro.

The prices for BEVs made in China advertised online have, if anything, somewhat fallen as documented in the data appendix. For example, the model Seal U of BYD was priced at 42 700 euro in 2024, and 39 000 euro in 2025, implying a reduction in price of 9%.[5]

As prices for EU consumers did not change, one would expect that import prices would fall substantially. However, this has not happened. Import unit values have fallen slightly as shown in the chart below, but not more so than those going to comparator countries without tariffs.

The unit values of imports from China (i.e. the import price per car) have been consistently somewhat lower than the overall average, but only by about 20%. Given the differentiated product nature of cars, this difference could be due to a different mix of models sold by Chinese producers. The difference in average price is also the reason why the share of China in EU imports is considerably higher in terms of the number of cars than in terms of value. For example, in Q1 2025 slightly more than one half (52 %) of all BEVs imported by the EU came from China, but in terms of the value of imports China accounted for only 42 %.[6]

Figure 1: EU Import and export unit value for BEVs



Source Comtrade units in USD.[7]

An even larger difference emerges if one compares the prices (unit values) of extra-EU exports to that of imports from China. The average price of the models the EU exports is at over 40 thousand USD more than twice as high as that of EU imports from China. The EU can thus run a large surplus in BEV trade, although trade is almost balanced in the number of cars. Many industry publications[8] and geo-political analyses (Atlantic Council (2025), CSIS (2024)) arrive at alarmist conclusions because they neglect this key difference between economic value and the number of cars traded (and produced).

[5]The exchange rate of the Renmimbi had changed very little between early 2024 and 2025. Since then, the CNY has depreciated by about 5%.
[6]Those who want to emphasize the threat of imports from China thus emphasize the share of China in terms of the number of cars, rather than the value of imports.
[7]Eurostat – Comext does not report unit and hence cannot be used to calculate unit values.
[8]For example the uropean Automobile Manufacturers' Association, ACEA,
https://www.acea.auto › pc-registrations › new-car-regis..., counts only the number of cars registered/sold.

Did import shares of Chinese BEVs fall with anti-subsidy tariffs? Not really

The central aim of the countervailing duties was to reduce imports from China. The data now available seems to suggest at first sight that this aim was achieved. As figure 2 below shows the share of China in extra-EU imports fell from around 55% in early 2024, just before the tariffs were announced, to about 42% in the second quarter of 2025.

However, this first impression might be misleading since the share of China had fluctuated over several years with peaks followed by declines in 2021and 2023.

Figure 2 illustrates how these fluctuations related to different stages of the decision-making process leading to the final decision in 2024. For example, the share of China in EU imports had remained rather stable over the period the Commission used to measure subsidies and calculate the duties to be applied (this is called the 'Investigation Period'; I.P. in the chart) which ran from end of 2022 to the end of 2023.

The Commission announced its findings in June of 2024, and the duties entered into force in October that year. In the following quarters the share of China in (the value of) EU BEV imports fell by 10 percentage points as mentioned above.

The key question is then whether this fall in market share should be attributed to the ASD. The causality is difficult to establish since there could be an underlying trend in Chinese BEV trade that coincided with the EU's decision to impose countervailing duties. Moreover, a long-run negative trend seems to be in place since 2021.

Figure 2: Country shares in EU BEV imports



Source: Comtrade

NON-EU countries as counterfactuals

To better assess the evolution of Chinese BEV imports, we analyze three European non-EU countries—the United Kingdom, Norway, and Switzerland—which **do not apply tariffs on Chinese BEVs**. Their car markets resemble that of the EU in being dominated by smaller models, unlike the United States, where larger vehicles prevail.

A first observation is that EU producers dominate these markets and that the share of imports from the EU has increased over the last year or so, capturing more than 50% of these markets.

Moreover, the market share of EU producers in these countries has on average increased since the quarter before the imposition of the duties by the EU. This provides a first indication that the competitive position of EU producers is much stronger than suggested by the prevailing narrative that they cannot compete with China (Ash and Inaki (2025), The Economist 2024, European Parliament (2024)).

Table 2: EU share of BEV imports of NON-EU countries

	2024-Q1	2024-Q2	2024-Q3	2024-Q4	2025-Q1	2025-Q2
Norway	49,3%	46,7%	48,9%	44,8%	51,6%	58,7%
U.K.	36,8%	44,9%	55,7%	59,6%	57,7%	61,2%
Switzerland	62,4%	54,5%	60,7%	61,0%	66,8%	62,2%

Source: Comdtrade

Chinese BEV market shares have fallen everywhere

The key test of the hypothesis that fall of China in EU BEV imports in 2025 was due to the countervailing tariffs is whether the share of China held up better in non-EU markets.

Figure 3 below shows the evolution of the market shares of China in total imports of BEVs for the EU and the 3 non-EU countries. The share of China is of course much lower for the three non-EU countries because EU exporters have a strong position there.

Figure 3: Market share of China, in the EU compared to non-EU countries



Source: own calculations based on Comtrade

Since the level of the import market shares differs across these countries, it might be best to look at the relative change in market shares since the tariffs were imposed by the EU.

Table 3 below thus shows in percentages the share of imports of BEVs coming from China in early 2025 compared to the same period in 2024. It is apparent that the market shares of China have fallen everywhere. In the EU market, share of China in the first half of 2025 was only 72% of the value of 2024. But the reduction in China's market share was exactly the same across the average of the 3 countries without tariffs. If one looks only at Q2 2025 (compared to Q2 2024), the fall has been even higher in the non-EU markets.

Table 3: Chinese market share reduction 2025

	Q2 2025	H1 2025
EU market	67%	72%
CH	73%	83%
UK	58%	61%
N	49%	72%
Average non EU	60%	72%

Source: own calculations based on Comtrade, N.b. every entry in this table shows the market share of China in total imports of the country concerned in Q2 or H1 2025, as a percentage of the corresponding value of 2024.

The, somewhat surprising, conclusion is that the data does not provide any support for the hypothesis that the substantial EU countervailing tariffs were the cause of the observed slight fall observed after the tariffs were imposed in mid-2024. This is in stark contrast to ex-ante studies that had predicted a strong fall in the market share of China.

The main reason could be the differentiated product nature of cars, that limits the substitutability across different makes and brands. Other factors like brand loyalty, dealership network, and after-sales service might also have played a role.

The presence of Chinese manufacturers on the EU market is relatively recent. An additional year might have allowed them to strengthen their dealership and after sales network, offsetting the effect of the tariffs. However, this argument also applies to the European non-EU markets considered here.

A comparison of the data on of import unit values also does not suggest that the EU tariffs did have a noticeable impact. Figure 4 below shows the unit values of BEV imports from China in different countries. The EU remains the most competitive market, where Chinese exporters sell lower priced vehicles. The chart also shows a common downward trend in import unit values declined (except in Switzerland).

Figure 4 Average border price per imported Chinese BEV



Source: Comtrade

Results from Simple Econometrics

We conclude the analysis by performing a simple econometric analysis in which we regress the share of BEV imports from China on a dummy variable equal to 1 for EU countries from the quarter in which the tariffs enter into force. The regression is thus a difference-in-difference comparing import shares from China between EU and non-EU countries before and after EU tariffs enter into force.

Table 4: Difference-in-Difference Regression Results

	China_Share	**Log China_IUV**
Coefficients	-0.048	0.101
	(0.030)	(0.156)
Pr(>|t|)	(0.126)	(0.528)
R2	0.863	0.748
R2 Within	0.008	0.001
Std.Errors	by: Country	by: Country
FE: Country	X	X
FE: Year-quarter	X	X

The results are presented in Table 4.[9] The estimated coefficient suggests that import from China falls by 5 percentage points for EU countries after tariffs are imposed. However, the coefficient is not statistically significant (p-value = 0.126).

Thus, the econometric analysis supports the view that the tariffs imposed by the EU did not have a significant effect relative to non-EU countries which did not impose tariffs. This is because, as shown in the previous section, BEV imports from China were on a declining trend in all countries.

We also estimate the same model using the logarithm of the unit import value (IUV) from China as the dependent variable. The estimated coefficient, presented in Table 4[10], is positive but again not statistically significant (p-value = 0.528). This indicates that the tariff did not have a measurable impact on the IUV. This result is consistent with the descriptive evidence presented earlier, which showed that IUVs were on a declining trend across both EU and non-EU countries alike, with the exception of Switzerland.

In sum, this simple econometric analysis supports the view that the tariffs imposed by the EU did not have a significant effect on Chinese BEV import shares relative to non-EU countries that did not impose tariffs.

Estimated potential tariff revenue is 2 billion per year

As noted above, the unweighted average tariff imposed in 2024 was about 20%. With pre-tariff imports of roughly €10 billion, this yields a top-down of tariff revenues of about €2 billion.

With data now available for the first half of 2025, a more precise assessment can be made using post-tariff import values. Since the market share of Chinese BEVs has not declined significantly, this immediately suggests that the top-down estimate remains broadly accurate.

A bottom-up estimate of tariff revenues requires detailed data on imports by model and manufacturer, given the wide dispersion of tariff rates across producers. However, such disaggregated import data is not publicly available. To approximate it, we combined publicly available trade data (Comtrade), vehicle registration data by model (JATO, 2025), and pricing information from official company websites. This allowed us to construct model- and maker-level estimates of imports, which could then be matched with the applicable tariff rates.

The bottom-up procedure began with Q1 2024 data on BEV imports from China to the EU by manufacturer, alongside EU registration figures. From these, we derived import-to-registration ratios for each manufacturer. Applying these ratios to Q1 2025 registration data yielded estimates of BEV import volumes from China in early 2025, disaggregated by manufacturer.

To estimate import values, we identified each manufacturer's most sold BEV models, retrieved their EU retail prices from official company websites, and computed weighted average prices by manufacturer. These retail prices (net of VAT) were then adjusted downward by 20% to approximate the import prices on which tariffs are levied.

[9] The estimates are obtained with OLS regressions including country and year-quarter fixed effects. Errors are clustered at the country-level.
[10] Data for Q2 2025 on the IUV include only April and May, as June data for unit imports were missing for several countries.

In the final step, we applied the manufacturer-specific duty rates to the estimated import values. For each company, tariff revenue was calculated as the product of Q1 2025 import volumes, weighted average prices, and the corresponding tariff rate. Summing across all manufacturers produced a total figure for Q1 2025, which was annualized by multiplying by four.

The main finding is that potential tariff revenue amounts to about €500 million per quarter, or roughly €2 billion per year, when calculated on the basis of Q1 2025 prices and estimated imports.

A clear majority of this revenue (around 80%) would be collected from Chinese-owned producers, with smaller shares from EU-owned firms and from UK and US manufacturers operating production facilities in China.

Table 5: Estimated quarterly income from tariff by nation of ownership

Country of company ownership	Estimated Income from tariff based on imports from Q1 2025 (in mln euro)	% of tariff income by headquarter of company
U.K.	4,9 €	1,0%
U.S.A.	10,9 €	2,2%
China	404,7€	80,4%
E.U.	82,4€	16,4%
Total	502,9€	100%

Source: Comtrade, Jato, BEV Companies website

Price floors rather than tariffs? Not a good idea

EU tariff revenues accrue to the EU budget, with the Member State through which imports enter the EU customs territory entitled to retain 25% to cover administrative costs. Since most BEVs arrive via the port of Rotterdam, the Netherlands could capture up to €500 million annually.

According to press reports (Reuters, 2025), the Commission has considered a Chinese proposal to replace tariffs with a minimum price commitment from Chinese exporters, a mechanism previously applied in the PV case in 2013 (Gros and Rotondi 2025). From an economic perspective, however, such an arrangement would be inefficient, as it would amount to an implicit transfer from European consumers to Chinese producers.

In addition, it would entail an annual revenue loss of around €2 billion for the EU, including roughly €1.5 billion for the EU budget (about 1% of total revenues), at a time when EU financing is under acute pressure.

Conclusions

A simple look at the evolution of China's share in EU BEV imports suggests that the Commission's own-initiative investigation of 2023 may have been based on a false alarm. China's share rose rapidly from almost zero to around 60% in 2021, fueling fears that Chinese imports could overwhelm the EU market.

Yet from 2021 onwards, this share began a gradual decline—well before even the prospect of anti-subsidy duties emerged. At the same time, the EU has maintained a strong export surplus in BEVs and expanded its market shares in European non-EU countries, indicating that EU producers remain competitive even against subsidized Chinese rivals.

So far, there is little evidence that the anti-subsidy duties have had any discernible effect. China's share in EU BEV imports has indeed fallen since the tariffs were introduced, but it has declined by a similar margin in non-EU European countries without tariff protection. This parallel trend suggests that the tariffs have had no specific impact on market shares—an unexpected result given their magnitude (up to 35%).

The tariffs nevertheless should generate substantial revenues, estimated at up to €2 billion per year for the EU budget. These would be forfeited if the Commission were to accept the Chinese producers' proposal to replace tariffs with a minimum price agreement.

The key to understanding the apparent contradiction between the prevailing narrative that China is outcompeting EU BEV producers lies in the price difference.

The price (unit value) EU producers can charge for their exports is twice as high as that of the car imported from the EU.

Most industry publications and geopolitical analysis focus on the number of cars imported from China, not their value.

Moreover, the focus on growing imports is misleading when exports increase at the same time. The growing share of China in the EU BEV was just part of a growing trade in this type of vehicles.

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Appendix:

Table with Detailed estimate for income from tariffs.

CHINA					
Company	**RegQ1/impQ1**	**Registration 25**	**Prices Net of Vat&Discounted**	**Tariff**	**Estimated Income in Mln €**
BYD	1	17729	31200	17%	94
MG	1	12967	20228	35,30%	93
POLESTAR	1	9662	55920	18,80%	102
VOLVO	0,48	22810	32672	18,80%	67
XPENG	1	3.377	41280	35,30%	49
					405

US					
Company	**RegQ1/impQ1**	**Registration 25**	**Prices Net of Vat&Discounted**	**Tariff**	**Estimated Income in Mln €**
Tesla	0,08	53237	31192	8%	11

EU					
Company	**RegQ1/impQ1**	**Registration 25**	**Prices Net of Vat&Discounted**	**Tariff**	**Estimated Income in Mln €**
BMW	0,09	38477	50756	20,70%	38
DACIA	1,00	7750	13520	20,70%	22
SMART	0,61	6.576,00	30320	18,80%	23
					82

UK					
Company	**RegQ1/impQ1**	**Registration 25**	**Prices Net of Vat&Discounted**	**Tariff**	**Estimated Income in Mln €**
MINI	0,07	14448	23603	20,70%	5

TOT	503
China	80%
US	2%
EU	16%
UK	1%

Table with Prices comparison per car model in EU.

CHINA			
Car Model	**EU price in € 2024**	**EU price in € 2025**	**Change% EU**
BYD SEAL U	35.322,31 €	32.231,40 €	-8,75%
MG 4	22.549,59 €	20.896,69 €	-7,33%
NIO ET 5 (long range)	49.173,55 €	46.223,14 €	-6,00%
LEAPMOTOR T03	12.809,92 €	9.917,36 €	-22,58%
VOLVO EX30	34.537,19 €	33.752,07 €	-2,27%
ZEEKR 7X	48.677,69 €	46.272,73 €	-4,94%
ZEEKR X	37.595,04 €	35.115,70 €	-6,59%
GWM 3 ORA	26.851,24 €	23.958,68 €	-10,77%
X PENG G9	50.909,09 €	49.256,20 €	-3,25%
X PENG G6	37.685,95 €	36.033,06 €	-4,39%

US			
Car Model	**EU price in € 2024**	**EU price in € 2025**	**Change% EU**
TESLA MODEL 3	34685,95 €	30570,25 €	-11,87%
TESLA MODEL Y	35280,99 €	33876,03 €	-3,98%

EU			
Car Model	**EU price in € 2024**	**EU price in € 2025**	**Change% EU**
BMW iX1	39.586,78 €	39.586,78 €	0,00%
BMW i4	65.280,99 €	65.280,99 €	0,00%
SMART 1	31.322,31 €	32.975,21 €	5,28%
DACIA SPRING	13.966,94 €	12.314,05 €	-11,83%

UK			
Car Model	**EU price in € 2024**	**EU price in € 2025**	**Change% EU**
LOTUS EMEYA	87.966,94 €	89.247,93 €	1,46%
ELECTRIC MINI COOPER	27.190,08 €	24.383,47 €	-10,32%

N.B. All prices are NET OF VAT

Table with Prices comparison per car model in China.

CHINA			
Car Model	**China price in € 2024**	**China price in € 2025**	**Change%**
BYD SEAL U	24.490,32 €	23.284,77 €	-4,92%
MG 4	14.941,94 €	14.543,05 €	-2,67%
NIO ET 5 (long range)	39.225,81 €	38.675,50 €	-1,40%
LEAPMOTOR T03	7.729,03 €	7.933,77 €	2,65%
VOLVO EX30	26.967,74 €	26.490,07 €	-1,77%
ZEEKR 7X	30.838,71 €	30.450,33 €	-1,26%
ZEEKR X	25.677,42 €	23.708,61 €	-7,67%
GWM 3 ORA	18.322,58 €	17.218,54 €	-6,03%
X PENG G9	34.051,61 €	32.953,64 €	-3,22%
X PENG G6	25.793,55 €	23.417,22 €	-9,21%

US			
Car Model	**China price in € 2024**	**China price in € 2025**	**Change% EU**
TESLA MODEL 3	29.922,58 €	31.192,05 €	4,24%
TESLA MODEL Y	32.245,16 €	34.900,66 €	8,24%

EU			
Car Model	**China price in € 2024**	**China price in € 2025**	**Change% EU**
BMW iX1	38.708,39 €	25.006,62 €	-35,40%
BMW i4	45.664,52 €	26.490,07 €	-41,99%
SMART 1	23.096,77 €	23.046,36 €	-0,22%
DACIA SPRING	9.187,10 €	8.913,91 €	-2,97%

UK			
Car Model	**China price in € 2024**	**China price in € 2025**	**Change% EU**
LOTUS EMEYA	72.000,00 €	69.933,77 €	-2,87%
ELECTRIC MINI COOPER	20.051,61 €	19.708,61 €	-1,71%

N.B. All prices are NET OF VAT