The Dangerous Temptation to Use War as an Electoral Strategy
History shows US presidents are more likely to launch conflicts under political pressure — but wars rarely solve domestic political problems. A commentary by Lorenzo Bini Smaghi
A week has passed since the start of the conflict with Iran, and questions persist over the underlying reasons that prompted the US administration to launch the operation. The more so because the White House has changed its account several times.
At first, the objective was to encourage a “regime change”, which Iranians themselves would supposedly bring about once the bombing had ended. Possible successors were even mentioned, but that scenario was later denied.
Another explanation was the need to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. Yet that argument sits uneasily with the president’s own statements after the bombing raids of June last year, when he said the strikes had “completely and totally obliterated” Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities.
A further justification invoked the need to protect the United States and its allies from imminent Iranian attacks, particularly involving intercontinental missiles. But no evidence has yet been produced to substantiate the immediacy of that threat, nor that Tehran possessed such weapons.
In recent days, the debate over the president’s real intentions has also intensified in the US. According to the Wall Street Journal, “U.S. officials and lawmakers with access to classified information, along with experts who have spent their careers poring over public data and government reports, say the administration’s assertions are incomplete, unsubstantiated, or flat-out wrong.”
The conflict in the Middle East is the latest stage in the intensification of geopolitical tensions set in motion by the United States in recent months: from the attack on Venezuela to its claims over Greenland, and then the embargo against Cuba, alongside the creation of the Board of Peace.
American history is strewn with conflicts and wars triggered for reasons that were not always clearly identified or fully understood, even in hindsight. This has drawn the attention of many scholars of international politics, as well as economists.
Some have sought to examine the extent to which US presidents have been inclined to use their discretionary powers in response to personal incentives, particularly the prospect of securing re-election. Economic research has focused above all on the incentive for governments to cut interest rates shortly before elections in order to provide a temporary boost to the economy and create favourable conditions at the polls.
But another hypothesis has also been explored: that military conflicts may be initiated in order to rally public opinion around the president, who, in his role as commander-in-chief, can be less easily criticised by the opposition — thereby improving his chances of re-election.
In an article published in 1995 in the American Economic Review, Gregory Hess and Athanasios Orphanides examined 90 years of American history. Their econometric analysis showed that the probability of the United States starting a conflict rises above 60 per cent in the year preceding a president’s re-election bid, particularly when the economy is struggling.
The Hess and Orphanides analysis runs only to the end of the 1980s. Even so, the period since then offers no shortage of examples that appear to support the thesis: from the bombing of Kuwait in 1991, the year before the end of George H W Bush’s first term, to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the year before the end of George W Bush’s first term, and the bombing of Libya in 2011, a year before the end of Barack Obama’s first term.
President Trump is not himself up for re-election and cannot serve another term. Even so, there is little doubt that this year’s midterm elections, in November, carry almost existential importance.
The President himself told House Republicans at a party retreat that they must retain control of the chamber in the midterm elections, saying he expected to face a third impeachment if Democrats retake the majority.
At present, polling suggests that after the midterms the House of Representatives will switch to a Democratic majority, with a probability of 80 per cent. In the Senate, by contrast, the president’s party is still expected to retain an advantage, but that probability has fallen from 70 per cent last December to 56 per cent just a few days ago.
As George Bush senior knew all too well, going to war is not enough to win an election. He lost to Bill Clinton, whose campaign strategist, James Carville, coined the famous phrase: “It’s the economy, stupid.”
It is worth remembering. Not least because wars often inflict considerable damage on the economy.
A previous version of this article was published by the Italian daily Il Foglio
IEP@BU does not express opinions of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.
