The ECB Is Changing Leaders at the Worst Possible Time
Christine Lagarde’s successor may have to fight inflation while containing bond market turmoil, testing the central bank’s credibility. A commentary by Lorenzo Bini Smaghi
The change of leadership at the European Central Bank could hardly come at a worse time.
There are several reasons for this.
First, price stability has not yet been secured. Eurozone inflation reached an estimated 4 per cent in October, up from 1.7 per cent in January. The surge of recent months is unlikely to reverse by February, when Christine Lagarde hands over to a new president, who is expected to be appointed shortly. The interest rate increases implemented over the past six months will probably not be enough, nor will any further hikes the central bank’s Governing Council may decide on at its next two meetings.
Although inflation is largely caused by the rise in energy prices following the war with Iran, policies supporting domestic demand are helping to prolong its impact on consumer prices. It is no coincidence that the International Monetary Fund has raised its forecast for 2027 eurozone inflation to 2.8 per cent, 0.6 percentage points higher than its April forecast.
There is therefore considerable uncertainty over how much further tightening will be needed before inflation is brought back under control.
The second reason why the handover is so delicate is the tension in international markets, reflected in rising long-term interest rates and widening yield spreads between countries. These tensions are particularly significant in the eurozone, where each state borrows separately, albeit in the same currency. This creates an additional risk, which partly depends on the central bank’s ability and willingness to intervene in sovereign bond markets if instability spreads to the real economy.
This specific risk does not exist in the United States. It helps explain why US 10-year government bond yields are roughly at the same level as those of France, even though the American fiscal deficit and public debt are higher. For 2026, the IMF forecasts a US deficit of 8.5 per cent of GDP and public debt of 126.8 per cent, compared with 5.4 per cent and 118.5 per cent respectively for France.
This type of tension is not new to the eurozone. It emerged during the 2011-12 crisis, in 2018 when the Italian spread rose to 300 basis points under Giuseppe Conte’s first government, and in March 2020 after the outbreak of Covid. In each of those episodes, the measures needed to counter financial tensions were consistent with the prevailing monetary policy stance. In other words, the pursuit of financial stability did not require measures that conflicted with price stability.
In autumn 2011, for example, the decision to extend the maturity of bank refinancing operations to ease tensions coincided with an interest rate cut.
At the end of July 2012, Mario Draghi’s “whatever it takes” pledge came just days after another rate cut.
After the outbreak of Covid in March 2020, when spreads widened further, partly because of unclear communication from the ECB, intervention in the markets took place while interest rates were still negative and inflation was falling.
Today, by contrast, measures to ensure financial stability could conflict with the monetary tightening needed to restore price stability. This situation is likely to persist in the coming months, not least in view of upcoming elections in several European countries. It could paralyse the central bank, for fear of compromising its primary objective or appearing too lenient towards a country’s public finances.
One example is the ECB’s decision to continue with quantitative tightening, the process of reducing the size of its balance sheet, as long-term interest rates rise. The US Federal Reserve, instead, suspended its balance sheet reduction in December 2025.
In this context, the ability to reconcile potentially conflicting objectives depends not only on the central bank’s actions but also on how financial markets perceive its determination to respond in an emergency.
One example is Draghi’s commitment in July 2012 that the ECB would do “whatever it takes” to preserve the euro, followed in September by the announcement of a bond-buying programme with no ex ante quantitative limits. The commitment was so credible to investors that it had an immediate effect without the ECB having to use the programme.
In fact, the ECB’s main instruments for countering financial instability, such as Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) and the Transmission Protection Instrument (TPI), have never been used, so far. The mere prospect of their use was enough to calm markets.
Guiding expectations requires carefully calibrated communication with financial markets. It is more of an art than a science.
For that reason, communication errors are not uncommon – even for central bankers - and can be difficult to remedy, especially at the start of a new mandate, as has also been seen recently in the United States.
Changing the ECB’s leadership at this moment, for reasons that are in any case hard to understand, might be an even greater mistake.
A previous version of this article was published in the Italian daily Il Foglio
IEP Bocconi does not express opinions of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.