The Economics of Bank Windfall Taxes

20/11/2026
Levies aimed at shareholders can change banks’ incentives and shift the burden on to savers, mortgage borrowers and small businesses
Number: 560
Year: 2026
Author(s): Lorenzo Bini Smaghi

Levies aimed at shareholders can change banks’ incentives and shift the burden on to savers, mortgage borrowers and small businesses. A commentary by Lorenzo Bini Smaghi

bini smaghi windfall tax

Economic policies sometimes produce outcomes that differ from, or even run counter to, their original aims. The mistake stems from the illusion that complex economic systems can be managed through simple, or simplistic, measures, without taking account of how economic agents respond.

A recent example is the tariffs imposed by the Trump administration. They were intended to reduce the trade imbalance and bring manufacturing production back to the United States.

The outcome has been disappointing, if not disastrous. America’s external deficit has not narrowed, and manufacturing employment has not increased significantly. Consumer prices, meanwhile, have risen, prompting many voters to cast their ballots against the president’s party.

What went wrong? Those who imposed the tariffs failed to take account of the response of economic agents, both American and foreign, and of the interaction with expansionary fiscal policy, which strengthened the dollar and largely offset the tariffs’ effect on the competitiveness of American products.

In other words, the economic system responded to the tariffs in ways that neutralised their effects. This is the so-called “law of unintended consequences”, studied by prominent economists and sociologists such as Pareto and Merton. Ignoring it risks further economic policy mistakes.

Another such mistake is taxing banks’ windfall profits. At first glance, the intention is to raise revenue from those who have made handsome profits. Yet the ultimate burden falls most heavily on the most vulnerable sections of the population. In other words, those who believe they are taxing the rich are in fact primarily taxing the poor.

Banks are unlike other businesses. Their role is to turn their customers’ savings into loans to other customers, particularly mortgages for households and businesses. To do so, banks must hold more capital than companies in other sectors, using it to absorb losses on loans that can no longer be recovered. The profits generated by intermediating savings provide the return on this capital.

The initial impact of a tax on bank profits falls on the providers of capital, namely shareholders. Shareholders, however, are under no obligation to hold shares in the sector being taxed, in this case banking. If banks are taxed more heavily than companies in other sectors, investors will tend to sell their bank shares and buy shares in other sectors or countries where the tax treatment is more favourable. Bank shares will therefore tend to fall relative to other stocks.

Faced with such an adverse development, a bank’s management and board of directors can reasonably be expected to respond, particularly to protect the company’s value, which ultimately depends on the return on capital. They can do so in several ways.

The first is to pass the tax burden on to customers, both depositors and borrowers.

The second is to increase profitability by cutting costs, particularly through staff reductions.

The third is to reduce less profitable lending, starting with mortgages and loans to small and medium-sized enterprises, with the aim of freeing up surplus capital to return to shareholders through share buybacks that support the share price. It is no coincidence that the banking sector, which is more heavily regulated and taxed than other sectors, is increasingly shifting its activities from straightforward lending to asset management and the provision of more profitable services.

In an efficient market, discriminatory taxation of a sector, particularly banking, falls less on shareholders, who can move into other investments, than on customers. Those who bear the brunt of the tax are small savers, who keep most of their savings in current accounts, households that need mortgages, and undercapitalised small and medium-sized enterprises with no access to alternative sources of finance.

The tax also penalises institutional shareholders such as foundations, which use a large part of the dividends they receive from banks to provide assistance in their local communities and fill gaps in support for those most in need.

To sum up, a tax on bank profits may appear at first to be a tax on the rich, but in reality it penalises the most vulnerable sections of the population. Failing to understand this is a mistake that becomes difficult to justify when repeated over time.

 

A previous version of this article was published in the Italian daily Il Foglio

IEP Bocconi does not express opinions of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.

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