From Epic Fury to Epic Failure in Iran
The war was meant to weaken Tehran and restore US deterrence. It may instead have strengthened both Iran and China. A commentary by Nathalie Tocci
What was meant to be an “Epic Fury” unleashed by the US president against the Islamic Republic of Iran has instead turned into an “Epic Failure”.
After having already “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear programme during the June 2025 war, Washington was expected to finish the job once and for all. But the ambition went further still: to dismantle Iran’s missile capabilities, force Tehran to abandon its network of regional proxies and, above all, bring down the regime itself.
Weakened by the latest wave of protests in January, the Islamic Republic appeared vulnerable. One final push by Israel and the United States, it was assumed, would suffice.
Instead, the outcome has been very different.
There is still no full clarity regarding the 14-point proposal reportedly presented by Washington to Pakistani mediators. Different versions continue to circulate, and confusion alone could once again derail negotiations.
The talks could collapse either because of the bellicose rhetoric emanating from Washington in favour of a renewed war, or because of the intransigence of an Iranian regime that has emerged more radicalised and hardened by the conflict.
Yet even if an agreement were ultimately reached broadly along the lines currently under discussion, it would still be difficult not to see in it a major strategic debacle for the United States.
The most immediate result would merely be the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. But this is precisely the point: before the war, the Strait was already open. Through the conflict, Iran has demonstrated its ability to threaten Hormuz and impose enormous economic costs on regional rivals and western powers alike.
Then there is the nuclear file itself.
Should the agreement provide for a complete suspension of uranium enrichment for a limited period — Iran reportedly pushing for five years, Washington for twenty — it would only marginally improve on the 2015 nuclear deal, which allowed Tehran limited enrichment at 3.67 per cent for fifteen years. Like the previous accord, the new arrangement would also be time-bound, thereby implicitly recognising Iran’s right to enrichment.
More importantly, while Barack Obama’s Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) established an exceptionally intrusive and detailed international verification mechanism, the current draft reportedly leaves many crucial aspects unresolved. This includes the fate of the 440 kilograms of uranium enriched above 60 per cent purity, a threshold dangerously close to weapons-grade material.
In essence, the foundations of any future agreement would not differ substantially — nor improve meaningfully — from those of the JCPOA, the very accord denounced by Donald Trump and abandoned by his first administration in 2018. Particularly when one considers the financial, political and security costs generated by the US withdrawal from that deal: the current war is, in many respects, one of its direct consequences.
Meanwhile, missiles are barely mentioned. Yet the war did not eliminate Iran’s missile capabilities, let alone its drone arsenal.
The latest attack on Fujairah in the United Arab Emirates stands as a stark reminder of that reality. Nor does the agreement address Iran’s regional militias. Hamas, despite devastating destruction, remains in control of what is left of Gaza; Hezbollah, though weakened, is still standing; and the Houthis in Yemen continue to provide Tehran with strategic leverage.
Finally, the Iranian regime not only remains in power but has become — predictably — more militarised and more repressive. Since mid-March, dozens of citizens have reportedly been executed under new legislation imposing harsher penalties for alleged espionage linked to foreign powers.
Rather than delivering a fatal blow to the Islamic Republic, the war risks having delegitimised Iran’s internal opposition while strengthening the hardliners.
All this unfolds against the backdrop of a conflict that, instead of reinforcing the US position in its strategic competition with China, may have achieved the opposite. Beijing is emerging as an increasingly indispensable interlocutor in the Gulf, while Iran is accelerating its energy and strategic co-operation with both China and Russia.
A previous version of this article was published by the Italian daily La Stampa
IEP@BU does not express opinions of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.
