The Europe We Need: Where Diversity Meets Unity
Francesco Billari, Rector of Bocconi University, argues that Europe must turn its pluralism into political cohesion, investing in education, institutional reform and a stronger shared capacity to act.
This article is an edited version of remarks delivered by Francesco Billari at the event “L’Europa in cammino. Dialogo, democrazia, libertà”, held at Bocconi University on 27 February 2026. The discussion brought together Cardinal Zuppi, Andrea Sironi, Francesco Billari and Sylvie Goulard to reflect on the future of the European project at a time of geopolitical tensions, rising polarization and declining trust in democratic institutions.
If Europe is unity in diversity, claiming the rule of law and rights also means claiming the right to be different. This is a point Europe must continue to affirm. In recent years, however, part of the European Union has remained relatively isolated in defending people’s rights. The risk is not only exposing Europe to the sometimes easy irony of those who reduce it to a regulatory machine while others act. The risk is also insisting too much on diversity and too little on unity.
Unity also means being strong when necessary. If Europe is the object of aggression—verbal or military—it cannot respond solely with weakness or with an abstract invocation of law. What is needed is a European strength that does not contradict the law but constitutes the condition for its effectiveness.
From this perspective, the real turning point is the right to unity. This is also a matter of intergenerational relations. Younger generations tend to be more educated and live more naturally within a European identity, yet Europe’s demographic dynamics reduce their political weight. As a result, their demand for greater unity does not find adequate follow-through among older generations.
One of the original weaknesses of European integration is that it began with the market. In some respects, this is its original sin.
The construction of a person’s identity begins in childhood and education, yet the European Union has never truly invested in building a common educational space.
European schools exist, but they are essentially designed for those working in EU institutions. A genuinely accessible model of European schooling—a sort of twenty-eighth educational regime—has never been developed. This also limits the functioning of the single market. When families move within the Union with children, those children are often penalized because school systems are not comparable. In other words, a Europe of work cannot fully function without a Europe of education and training.
This gap is also reflected in university life. Bocconi has, over time, become a major European university and represents, in part, a microcosm of what Europe could be: a bilingual, open space shaped by multiple identities. Yet language itself shows how integration requires continuous effort.
A common lingua franca—today, de facto, English—can serve as glue, provided it does not erase plural belonging. European identity does not replace other identities; it layers them. One can be Italian, European, Milanese, an Inter supporter, and the child of southern Italians.
Europe works when it recognizes this multiplicity, and when bilingualism or multilingualism become practices of inclusion rather than instruments of exclusion.
At a broader political level, data show a polarization that cuts across the entire West and beyond. Cities tend to be more progressive, rural areas less so; the more educated tend to be more progressive, the less educated less so; women appear on average more progressive than men.
In this context, elections are often decided by very narrow margins, yet produce long-term effects. Brexit is the clearest example: an irreversible decision taken 52 to 48, against the orientation of the young, European residents, and major cities.
This polarization has at least three structural causes. First, migration flows are creating a growing number of residents who contribute to European economies but remain excluded from voting. Second, a demographic factor: for the first time in history, young people carry so little weight, reducing collective projection toward the future. Third, electoral systems. For a long time, strongly majoritarian or bonus-based systems were considered desirable because they ensured governability.
Today, however, these systems tend to exacerbate polarization. A winner-takes-all model risks permanently marginalizing the segments most oriented toward the future: people living in cities, the more educated, women, and young people.
This does not mean advocating rule by the educated but recognizing that a democracy in which the most dynamic and open components of society are systematically defeated or neutralized becomes unsustainable. Hence, the need to rethink electoral systems and recover a greater degree of proportionality.
Despite everything, Europe retains extraordinary attractiveness. Looking at global migration intentions and considering the European Union as a whole, it remains one of the most desired destinations. In a sense, the world continues to vote for Europe with its feet. This means the European model still holds value—but it must decide to live up to itself.
To do so requires a political leap. At some point, Europeans will have to decide whether they truly want to be together. It will not be possible indefinitely to build the Union only through minimal compromises or narrow thematic coalitions.
Those formulas may work in some areas, but they are insufficient as a general model. Europe remains a model for the world—but it must choose to fully become what it already partly is. Ultimately, it must decide to be Europe.
IEP@BU does not express opinions of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.
