Europe’s Choices, IEP Bocconi’s Contribution

19/11/2026
IEP BOCCONI ANNUAL EVENT. Opening remarks by Paloma Lopez-Garcia, Director of IEP Bocconi, at “At the Table or on the Menu? Europe, Middle Powers and International Order”, held in Milan on 18 November 2026.
Number: 557
Year: 2026
Author(s): Paloma Lopez Garcia

IEP BOCCONI ANNUAL EVENT. Opening remarks by Paloma Lopez-Garcia, Director of IEP Bocconi, at “At the Table or on the Menu? Europe, Middle Powers and International Order”, held in Milan on 18 November 2026.

 
 
paloma annual

Paloma Lopez-Garcia, Director of IEP Bocconi, delivered these remarks at the opening of the 2026 IEP Bocconi Annual Event, “At the Table or on the Menu? Europe, Middle Powers and International Order”, held at SDA Bocconi School of Management in Milan on 18 November 2026.

 

 

Good morning, everyone.

Thank you, Rector Billari. Thank you, President Cartabia, for the welcome. I am also very glad to welcome President Sironi, President of Bocconi University; IEP’s Honorary President, Mario Monti; our founding President, Guido Tabellini; and Angelo Provasoli, Managing Director of Fondazione Bocconi. Welcome, everyone, and thank you for being here.

I am Paloma Lopez-Garcia. This is my first annual event as Director of the Institute for European Policymaking, also known as IEP. To be here, standing in front of all of you, is a real privilege, and also a responsibility, because the question we chose for today is not a small one: At the Table or on the Menu? I would like to use my fifteen minutes to explain why we chose it, what we think is at stake, and what an institute like ours can contribute.

Let me start with where Europe stands.

For most of the post-war period, Europe could take the international order for granted. It was an order based on rules, institutions, and multilateral cooperation, sustained largely by American power. And Europe could do well in it without being a superpower, because the system worked in its favour. European integration was itself one of that order’s greatest successes. Countries that had fought devastating wars chose to work together. Not because they shared an ethnicity or a religion, but because they shared a commitment to rules, to democracy, and to human dignity. And they learned to settle disagreements through institutions rather than force.

That world is changing. In his speech at Davos in January, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney put it with unusual clarity: the rules-based order sustained by American power has become a fiction. But none of us discovered this yesterday, or in January. Since 2014, European leaders have been talking more and more about strategy, power, and autonomy.

So what is different now? I would argue, three things.

First, interdependence has changed meaning. We once saw our links in trade, finance, technology, and energy as sources of prosperity and peace. Today they can also be instruments of pressure.

Second, the pressure no longer comes only from rivals. Even among close allies, the assumptions we relied on for decades can no longer be taken for granted. And we are watching larger powers compete, and perhaps collude, over spheres of influence.

Third, rules are losing their centrality. Not just being broken, which has always happened, but being treated as optional. And Europe, which has no independent hard power to speak of, has depended on rules more than almost anyone.

So, broadly, two worlds lie ahead of us. In one, the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must. In the other, middle powers organise together to reform and, where needed, reimagine the norms that once governed international society. For Europe, this is not an external question. It is internal, and it is existential.

So what are Europe’s options? I do not want to define today’s discussion for you. I would rather name the broad options, and say that each has real advantages and real trade-offs.

One option is for Europe to act as a superpower, alongside the United States and China, using its market size, its regulation, and its economic weight, as others do. The attraction is clear: in a world of power politics, being defenceless is not an option. The limits are also clear. Europe’s economic weight is not matched by the same political unity or hard power. And there is a deeper question: would Europe still be Europe, if it gave up the values and rules that define it?

Another option is to remain a middle power: to defend multilateralism and adapt pragmatically, avoiding the cost of doing everything alone. But it carries a risk, that important decisions on technology, trade, energy, and security are taken elsewhere.

A third option, which we at IEP have been exploring, is for Europe to act as a central power. Not a superpower, and not one middle power among many, but the actor that helps bring together countries that share an interest in an open, rules-based system: from Canada and Japan to the UK, Norway, and Australia, with looser partnerships beyond. This has trade-offs too, starting with the fact that leadership through cooperation requires restraint as well as strength.

You will hear today where our speakers agree with these views, and where they do not. Good. That is the point of the day.

But choosing a direction is only the beginning. Every strategic choice has to be translated into concrete policies, and that is where the real difficulty starts. So I would ask that we keep three questions in mind throughout the day. What are the trade-offs of each choice? How can we mitigate the costs, and share the benefits? And what are the concrete implications for policy?

These questions matter now more than ever, because many of the decisions Europe took in the past were taken under a different framework, with different rules and different assumptions. The same files now look different.

Take defence, for example. For decades, Europe could rely on capabilities provided by the United States: command and control, intelligence, strategic enablers. So the question for Europe was, to a large extent, how much to spend. In the new world, that is no longer enough. We have to think about capabilities, what we need and what we can build. About coordination, how we buy together and avoid fragmentation. About enablers, the things we used to take for granted. And, yes, also about spending. Different world, different policies.

Take technology and AI. Europe has lagged behind the United States in innovation for a long time. That is not new. But AI is different. First, because it is a general purpose technology. Like electricity or the internet, it will change how almost every sector produces, and how we work and learn. Second, because it is a lever of geopolitical influence: whoever controls the models, the chips, and the computing power can use that position to shape what others can do. And third, because this time we are behind not one, but two: the United States and China. So technology policy can no longer be only about competitiveness and innovation. It also has to bring in geopolitical considerations. And that changes the questions we ask.

Take energy. Europe achieved a rapid decoupling from Russian fossil fuels, something that once seemed unthinkable. And it did so partly thanks to investment in renewables. So the green transition became part of our energy security. But around two-thirds of the green technologies at the heart of the transition, batteries, solar panels, electric vehicles, come from a single supplier. So the question is: how do we build resilience without slowing decarbonisation?

Take trade. Openness is part of who we are. We built our prosperity on exchange with the world. We have been very good at it, and our firms have benefited greatly from global value chains. But the world our openness was built for is changing. Trade is now also used as a geopolitical lever. So the question is not whether Europe can stay open. The question is how. Do we protect more, and accept the costs of closing parts of our economy? Do we keep the system open, and work to rewrite its rules? Or do we find a path between the two?

These are four different files, with four different questions, but one common thread. In each of them, the rules of the game have changed, and the answers we built for the old world will not simply work in the new one. That is why we start today from one big question: what role does Europe want to play in the world? And only then turn to the individual files, one panel at a time. Because what we decide on one file shapes what is possible on the others.

And none of these choices is easy. Not because anyone lacks intelligence or goodwill, but because every choice involves trade-offs. Defence, the green transition, and digital investment compete for the same limited fiscal space, and sometimes for the same industrial inputs. Because costs come first and are visible, while benefits come later and are diffuse. Because strategic choices span decades, and mandates span four or five years. And because there are winners and losers: protecting an industry helps its workers and affects its customers, and the transition redistributes costs across regions and social groups.

Which brings me to something I believe matters as much as the choices themselves: how we explain them. Policies are only sustainable if people come along with them. And people come along when they understand what is being asked of them: what it will cost, what it will bring, who benefits first and who later, and why the alternative is worse. That requires clear and honest communication, based on facts. It is demanding for everyone: researchers, institutions, media, business, and public authorities alike.

Simple narratives are always more tempting, in a world of short attention spans. But simple narratives do not help us decide well, and they do not help us explain difficult choices.

This is where a place like IEP can help: as a bridge between those who study problems and those who have to solve them.

Our strength is that IEP sits within a world-class university and is multidisciplinary by design, because Europe’s problems do not organise themselves by academic discipline. Trade coercion is at once an economic, a legal, and a political question. Energy connects macroeconomics, climate science, industrial policy, and geopolitics. Defence cannot be separated from public finance and industrial organisation.

In this new phase of IEP, I want to leverage that strength. So we have created task forces of experts from different disciplines, working on the key topics we are discussing today. Each discipline sees a different part of the question, and the aim is to bring those views together into one common narrative. All of this work will result in topic-specific reports, which we will present in 2027.

But a bridge needs both sides. That is why I have brought this annual event to the core of our research-to-policy cycle. Here, researchers meet practitioners, policymakers, and industry: those who know what is feasible, what is binding, and what actually happens on the ground. So the discussion today is a crucial input into the expertise we are building, expertise that can inform the policy debate.

Let me end with a bit of hope.

We are holding this event at Bocconi, an international university. Look around this room: students and faculty from many countries, learning together. Many of you have worked and studied in different European countries. You have made friends across borders, learned other languages, and some of you have built relationships and families that cross borders. You have grown up in a Europe of open borders.

That reality exists because earlier generations took difficult and bold decisions. They bet that countries gain more by integrating than by standing apart. They took those decisions when the costs came first, when the benefits were not yet visible, and when success was far from guaranteed. What young Europeans live as an everyday reality is the result of those choices.

My hope is that the work of integration that remains will be somewhat easier, precisely because of that. The young Europeans who have lived Europe in a way that many of us never did will, in time, be in central positions: in institutions, in companies, in universities. They will build on what has been done, and look at Europe with a wider lens: not only as the sum of 27 countries, but as one shared home.

Thank you very much.

IEP Bocconi does not express opinions of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.

If you want to stay up-to-date with the initiative of the Institute for European Policymaking@Bocconi University, subscribe to our monthly NEWSLETTER here.