Europe’s Defence Awakening: A High-Stakes Balancing Act
The normalisation of war in political discourse is forcing a renegotiation of the European welfare state, a delicate balancing act that will determine whether defence budgets remain sustainable in the long run. A commentary by Stephanie Hofmann & Catherine E. De Vries
How to organise Europe’s security has become a defining priority for the continent’s leaders. In recent weeks, impromptu summits in London and Brussels have yielded fresh commitments to higher defence spending, unwavering support for Ukraine, and a renewed focus on military readiness.
But amid this flurry of strategic realignment, one fundamental issue risks being overlooked: sustaining public support for these efforts.
Without it, Europe’s newfound defence ambitions may prove fragile. Rearmament is expensive, and citizens must not only understand but also accept the financial sacrifices it entails.
Failure to manage these expectations could embolden far-right populists, destabilising European security in much the same way that the Trump administration is now disrupting America’s strategic commitments.
Had Europe’s founding fathers succeeded, the continent might have had a common defence framework as early as the 1950s. The proposed European Defence Community, signed by France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg, collapsed when a shift in French domestic politics led to its rejection in parliament.
Over the decades, other efforts to unify European defence policies faltered, largely due to concerns about undermining NATO’s transatlantic security guarantees. Instead, European integration focused on economic cooperation, with some heralding the EU as a peace project rather than a military alliance.
But a newly aggressive Russia to the east and an unpredictable, often antagonistic United States to “the West” have forced a strategic rethink. European leaders are now repurposing the EU’s role, not only by strengthening support for Ukraine but by taking decisive steps towards greater defence autonomy.
These shifts mark a radical departure from the piecemeal advances in European security policy seen since the end of the Cold War.
A European Zeitenwende—a watershed moment in defence policy—is unfolding. Where once joint procurement of military equipment was seen as a tentative step, now discussions on European defence financing are taking centre stage, with the European Commission emerging as a key player in security and defence initiatives.
As the EU moves out of NATO’s shadow, the political stakes rise. The cost of rearmament and military readiness will have direct implications for European voters, who have traditionally prioritised social welfare over defence spending.
The normalisation of war in political discourse is forcing a renegotiation of the European welfare state, a delicate balancing act that will determine whether defence budgets remain sustainable in the long run.
A Shifting Public Mood
For this strategy to succeed, European leaders must secure long-term public support for deeper defence commitments and continued assistance to Ukraine. However, recent polls suggest that public support is waning.
A Eurobarometer survey from late 2023 found that while 89% of Europeans backed humanitarian aid for those affected by the war and 84% supported accepting refugees, only 72% favoured financial aid for Ukraine.
Support for military assistance was even lower, with just 60% endorsing the financing of arms deliveries. Meanwhile, only 61% backed Ukraine’s EU candidacy—a concerning figure given the political capital invested in Kyiv’s European integration.
Beyond these static figures, the broader trends are even more telling.
Survey research called eupinions conducted by Bertelsmann Stiftung has tracked shifting European sentiment on military aid, refugee policy, defence cooperation, and Ukraine’s EU bid since March 2022.
The results highlight a slow but steady erosion of support. Poland has consistently shown the strongest backing for military aid to Ukraine, though this has declined from 84% in March 2022 to 71% by late 2024. Italy remains the most sceptical, while across the EU, support for weapons deliveries had fallen to just 51% by the end of 2024.
On refugee policy, Spain initially recorded the highest support levels, but approval has dropped from 93% in early 2022 to 75% by late 2024. In Germany, the decline has been steeper, from 86% to 58%, the largest drop in the bloc. By the end of 2024, an EU-wide majority of 64% still backed accepting Ukrainian refugees, but the downward trend is unmistakable.
Similarly, enthusiasm for deeper European defence cooperation has begun to fade. In Spain, support fell from 92% in early 2022 to 83% by late 2024. In France, it slipped from 87% to 71% over the same period. By the end of 2024, 78% of Europeans still favoured closer military collaboration, but cracks in consensus are appearing.
A European Council on Foreign Relations survey from mid-2024 reinforces these findings, revealing that majorities in France and Italy oppose increased defence spending if it comes at the expense of social priorities like healthcare and education.
In Germany, over half of the respondents expressed scepticism towards Ukraine’s EU membership, citing concerns over corruption, security risks, and the potential financial burden.
The Rocky Road Ahead
The challenge for European leaders is clear: maintaining a credible and durable security strategy requires a sustained effort to rally public opinion. A compelling narrative must be forged—one that conveys both the geopolitical urgency of the moment and the sacrifices needed to meet it. Without a transparent and honest dialogue about the trade-offs involved, Europe’s security ambitions could falter at the ballot box.
The unpredictability of US policy adds another layer of complexity. A sudden pivot by Donald Trump, who has spent years undermining NATO, could send shockwaves through European defence planning. If he were to rebrand himself as NATO’s reluctant saviour, the alliance’s future would be thrown into fresh uncertainty. For now, NATO remains intact, though increasingly sidelined.
Without firm American assurances, the transatlantic security order will continue to shift. The once-automatic flow of US weapons to European allies is no longer guaranteed, and the EU is gearing up to rely on its own defence industry. In the coming years, European and American arms manufacturers are likely to compete fiercely for global markets, altering the defence landscape irrevocably.
Ultimately, European voters will have to grapple with a fundamental question: How much defence spending is enough to feel secure? As the continent stands at a crossroads, both leaders and citizens must decide whether they are willing to bear the costs of shaping Europe’s future—or risk having it shaped for them.
IEP@BU does not express opinions of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.
