Europe’s Strategic Autonomy Will Be Decided in Ukraine

Every time European leaders talk about defence, the conversation turns to money. How much should we spend? How many more shells should we produce? How do we stop relying on America?

These are fair questions. Europe does need to spend more. But I have been fighting Vladimir Putin for twenty-six years, and I have learnt something about him. He does not fear budgets. He fears resolve. Europe’s biggest weakness is not a shortage of weapons. It is a reluctance to confront him.

Putin has been testing the West for years. He makes a threat. He watches how we react. Then he adjusts.

Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, we have seen this pattern again and again. He warned of terrible consequences if the West sent tanks. Then fighter jets. Then long-range missiles. In the end, every one of those weapons was delivered. Nothing happened. His threats were bluster.

But the bluster worked. While European capitals debated whether helping Ukraine might provoke him, Ukrainian soldiers were dying and Russian forces were digging in. Putin learnt that the threat of escalation could not stop the West. It could only slow it down. For him, that was enough.

I fear the same thing is about to happen with the debate over European strategic autonomy. We could spend years designing new defence structures while failing to make the decisions that would make Europe safer today.

Ukraine is the obvious place to start. Its soldiers are holding back the Russian army at an enormous price. Every Russian tank destroyed in Ukraine is a tank that will never roll towards Warsaw or Vilnius. Every month Ukraine holds out is another month for Europe to rebuild its own defences. There is no cheaper or more effective way for Europe to protect itself than to make sure Ukraine can keep fighting.

That means sending weapons on the scale Ukraine actually needs. It means giving Ukraine the ability to hit the airfields, depots and refineries Russia uses to wage this war. It means getting air defence to Ukrainian cities before the next wave of missiles, not after the funerals.

Every one of these decisions should be judged by a single test. Does it help Ukraine win? What Putin might think should not come into it.

There is another part of this argument that I know particularly well. Europe has enormous financial power over Russia. It has been painfully slow to use it.

Around €210 billion of Russian central bank money is frozen in the European Union. Most of it sits in Belgium. I have argued for years that this money should be confiscated and used to pay for Ukraine’s defence and reconstruction. The logic is simple. Russia invaded its neighbour. Russia caused the damage. Russia should pay for it.

Instead, Europe’s leaders chose to borrow €90 billion to keep Ukraine going through 2026 and 2027, and left Russia’s money untouched. That is not a solution. It is a postponement. Ukraine is already reporting a $27 billion hole in this year’s defence budget.

If the war runs into 2028, Europe will face exactly the same question again. How do we pay for Ukraine’s defence? And hundreds of billions in Russian money will still be sitting in European vaults. How many times will European governments ask their own taxpayers to foot the bill before they make Russia pay? The money is right there. Every year Europe refuses to touch it is another year Putin gets to wage war at a discount.

The same timidity runs through sanctions policy.

My campaign began with a personal tragedy. My lawyer, Sergei Magnitsky, uncovered a $230 million fraud committed by Russian officials. He was arrested, tortured and killed in a Russian prison in 2009. I made it my mission to make sure the people responsible could not hide their money or travel freely in the West. That fight taught me a simple lesson. Sanctions only matter if they bite.

Europe’s sanctions on Russia are not biting hard enough. Package after package has been announced, yet Moscow keeps selling its oil. Western governments have spent years chasing shadow fleet tankers around the world. Every time one is sanctioned, another takes its place. It is a game of whack-a-mole, and Putin is winning it.

There is a much simpler approach. Around 80 per cent of Russia’s oil is bought by just eight companies in China, India and Turkey. These are big businesses. They have banks, trading partners and customers in the West. They need access to our financial system far more than they need discounted Russian crude.

Europe should sanction all eight. Make them choose between Russian oil and the Western economy. I have no doubt which they would choose. Cut off those buyers and the money paying for the missiles falling on Kyiv dries up. Another sanctions package means very little if the money keeps flowing.

None of this means Europe can do without real military strength. It needs to make far more ammunition. It needs better air defence. Its armies need to be able to fight together. NATO remains essential. But European governments must be ready to act on their own when American support is uncertain. That will take serious industrial investment and some politically painful choices.

What worries me is that strategic autonomy becomes a way to talk about what Europe might be able to do in ten years while avoiding what it could do today. Confiscating Russian assets does not require a European army. Neither does sanctioning eight oil buyers. Neither does sending Ukraine weapons that are already sitting in our warehouses.

Putin understands one thing above all else. Weakness. He feeds on division and hesitation. As long as they keep working for him, he has no reason to stop.

IEP Bocconi does not express opinions of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.

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