Europe’s Young Have Good Reason to Protest
Governments increasingly favour older voters, leaving younger generations with fewer opportunities and a growing debt burden. A commentary by Lorenzo Bini Smaghi
Youth protests in many European cities, from Paris to Milan, have prompted reactions from the public, commentators and political parties that have focused chiefly on violence on the fringes of these events. The debate has centred on security measures to prevent such episodes from recurring, and on their supposed effectiveness.
Few, however, have tried to understand why young people took to the streets, the overwhelming majority of them peacefully. And they will continue to do so, inadvertently creating opportunities for further infiltration by violent groups.
A dismissive tone has prevailed in much of the commentary, typical of those who, beyond a certain age, believe wisdom to be a prerogative of seniority. It often lumps peaceful and violent protesters together. Others reach for the usual explanations, according to which young people’s discontent stems from growing inequalities in western societies between the few, indeed the very few, who have ever more and the many who have ever less.
Yet blaming all our problems on the 1 per cent of the population that holds much of the wealth overlooks another inequality, or injustice, within the remaining 99 per cent, about which little is said. This is the divide between generations. Intergenerational inequalities are widening, and not only in advanced economies, as India shows. One need only look at the data.
To take just a few examples, the share of public spending devoted to education has fallen in every European country since 2000. Italy and France have recorded some of the steepest declines, from 9.6 to 6.9 per cent and from 10.4 to 7.8 per cent, respectively. Over the same period, the share devoted to pensions has risen everywhere, from 26 to 30 per cent in Italy and from 20 to 24 per cent in France.
In other words, we are spending less and less on the young and more and more on the old, even after allowing for demographic trends.
The reason is simple: the relative numbers of voters. There are more and more older voters and fewer and fewer younger ones. Elections are won by promising favours to the old, or to those approaching old age, rather than with programmes benefiting the young.
The best-known example in Italy is “Quota 100”, the early retirement scheme whose promise of a generational handover, “one older worker retiring to be replaced by three young people”, proved illusory.
Taken together, the tax and spending measures adopted in recent years have almost invariably tilted the balance in favour of older people. Even an exceptionally generous measure, if that is how we wish to describe it, such as the 110 per cent Superbonus tax incentive, benefited those who already owned a home. The housing shortage, particularly for students in big cities, has worsened in recent years. Not to mention the barriers to competition that prevent young people from starting businesses. Italy has the lowest business birth rate in Europe.
The quality of public spending on the young, including education, has also deteriorated markedly over time, as international tests show. The share of students leaving Italian schools with an adequate level of attainment has fallen to worrying levels. This is partly because Italy was among the countries that imposed the longest periods of remote learning during the Covid-19 pandemic.
Youth unemployment has fallen over the course of this century, from around 30 per cent to just over 20 per cent in 2025. But this improvement is no different from that seen among the rest of the population and reflects a sharp fall in the labour force participation rate. Italy has one of Europe’s highest shares of young people who are not studying and are no longer looking for work.
To make matters worse, this redistribution of resources at the expense of the young is being financed by public debt. The burden grows over time and will therefore fall on future generations.
Over the past 25 years, Italian public debt per citizen has risen from €22,500 to €52,500. The ratio of public debt per capita to per capita income has risen from 96 to 137 per cent, while average wages have remained virtually unchanged after inflation.
Against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising that the number of young Italians emigrating rises each year, with graduates making up half of them. Nor should it come as a surprise that those who stay are dissatisfied with their lives and the prospects before them, or that they wish to protest in public their discontent.
Hopefully, without outbreaks of violence on the fringes of their protests. Violence for which they bear no responsibility.
A previous version of this article was published in the Italian daily Il Foglio
IEP Bocconi does not express opinions of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.
