Federica Mogherini: The EU’s Diplomatic Power Depends on Political Will

19/11/2026
IEP Bocconi Podcast - Policy Insight - The former EU High Representative on Iran, Ukraine and the future of European integration
Number: 559
Year: 2026
Author(s): Federica Mogherini

IEP Bocconi Podcast - Policy Insight - The former EU High Representative on Iran, Ukraine and the future of European integration. An interview by Stefano Feltri

mogherini policy focus

How can Europe turn a place at the negotiating table into real influence? Federica Mogherini, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy from 2014 to 2019, helped conclude the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Today, Europe faces a more divided international order and disagreement over how it should act.

In this conversation with Stefano Feltri, Mogherini examines what made European diplomacy effective in the Iran talks and where the EU could still make a difference, from a possible Middle East peace process to negotiations over Ukraine. She argues that political will matters more than institutional structures, and warns that national political shifts could threaten European integration.

The interview was conducted on the occasion of the IEP Bocconi Annual Event in Milan on 18 November 2026, “At the Table or on the Menu? Europe, Middle Powers and International Order”.

In 2015, the EU helped bring the United States, China, Russia and Iran to an agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme. What could Europe contribute that no other participant could provide? What was distinctive about its role?

First of all, there was a clear mandate from the UN Security Council, given many years earlier, unanimously, by the P5, to the High Representative of the European Union. That was mainly because the EU was what you would call a central power, with good relations with all the players around the table and the capacity to mediate and facilitate the process.

In that process, the EU was not one of the negotiating sides; it was the facilitator. It was not one of those sitting around the table, but the one setting the table, which was a different role. It had leverage over Iran through sanctions relief, but it also had an interest in reaching an agreement, for both security and economic reasons.

That kind of setup, I think, is very difficult to re-establish today, because the dynamics have changed. But I think the EU could still be an excellent facilitator in many other processes that are basically not taking place anymore. It still has great potential to facilitate processes in conflict and crisis areas where it is not necessarily a party to the conflict, but is a powerful player that can provide incentives to the parties.

Which conflicts or regions do you have in mind?

For instance, if at some point the Middle East peace process resumes. We will see how the situation with the Israeli government develops. This is an area where the EU has a lot of leverage, a lot of incentives to offer, and puts a lot of money into the region.

If the Palestinian Authority still exists, more or less, it is because the EU is supporting it in every way. If at some point there is an Israeli leadership willing to engage in a meaningful process, and if the United States contributes positively, the EU could play a very positive and active role in resolving that crisis and establishing a Palestinian state. That could be in a few years. It is not only about reconstructing Gaza; it is about establishing a political entity, a Palestinian state.

That is one of the possibilities I have in mind. I know it can sound extremely surreal today, but I think it could be possible in a couple of years.

Was it a mistake not to sanction Prime Minister Netanyahu and other members of his government? You said sanctions created leverage in the Iran negotiations. Some argue that Europe undermined its credibility by sanctioning Putin and Russian oligarchs while targeting only a few extremists on Israel’s far right.

Double standards weaken your credibility and your capacity to have an impact. It is the fastest way to diminish your own power. It is difficult for me to judge, from outside the room, the dynamics that led to that decision.

What I am saying is that sanctions are an effective tool, provided they are accompanied by a political process of dialogue at least as strong as the sanctions themselves. Sanctions are useful if they can be introduced and lifted. Their most powerful aspect is actually the opportunity to lift them if an agreement is reached.

Sanctions for their own sake do not lead anywhere. They can be an instrument in an overall strategy that includes, and above all emphasises, dialogue and negotiations. If you have no role in the dialogue and negotiations, sanctions will not take you far.

At the moment there is no peace process in the Middle East. There is not even a dialogue on the establishment of a Palestinian state. I think the last time the Middle East Quartet met was during my mandate, in 2016, before the first Trump administration. Since then, there has not been anything going on.

But if, at some point, depending on the Israeli leadership and partly on the American leadership, talks resume, I think the EU is very well positioned to play an active role, provided it manages to have a united position. That is always complicated on the Middle East, but not impossible at all.

Negotiations over Ukraine finally seem to be starting, but the EU has been criticised for having too many people at the table. Does Europe need to speak with one voice to be effective, or could different perspectives help at least one of those voices carry weight?

I have never been much of a fan of the “speaking with one voice” motto. I think it can sometimes be useful to have multiple voices, provided they convey the same message. Different voices can add nuance to the message and reach different interlocutors in different ways.

Having more than one voice at the table could be tactically useful, provided everyone is working towards one policy and there is a common strategy. In this case, I am not 100 per cent sure that is so, because the different voices are there on a national basis. That might be slightly problematic: different players around the table might have different agendas.

That is the point. It is not how many people are there; it is what European line those different voices can defend or promote.

Having said that, on Ukraine, I think the main European interest is to make sure Ukraine is not left alone. That is the key point. With the current US administration’s posture on Ukraine, having Ukraine, Russia and the United States at the table exposes Ukraine to being basically alone with an aggressor and a mediator that is partly on the aggressor’s side.

The Europeans’ role at that table is, of course, to make sure no security architecture is put in place that damages or threatens the security of the rest of Europe. But it is also, and mainly, to make sure Ukraine is supported in its demands.

It is very difficult to conceive of Europeans defining a line on how to end the conflict without following Ukrainian leadership. At the end of the day, it is up to Ukrainians to decide their way out of the conflict. The rest of Europe could do nothing but support whatever Zelensky brings to the table.

In that respect, the Europeans’ role would be very particular, because they are, in a sense, a party with an interest in the conflict. It is certainly not a mediator’s role.

In her State of the Union speech, Ursula von der Leyen said she was open to a European Security Council. Could it help Europe respond to the next crisis without starting from scratch over how to act and who should lead? What form should it take?

Europeans, not only the European Union, are masters at working on structures and processes. Whenever we have an issue to address, we focus on the process, the structure and the rules around it.

But my experience in the European institutions, both as a minister attending the Council and representing a member state, and even more as High Representative chairing the Council, is that the problem is never a lack of structures. It is always a lack of political will.

If there is a will to do something together, the EU can be extremely fast, extremely relevant and extremely united, provided there is a sense of urgency and a willingness to act. Structures are the least relevant point. A Security Council could be a good idea, but I do not think the absence of one would damage our ability to act together in the future.

Sometimes we have structures that are not used. Sometimes we manage to do things without structures in place. I do not think this is the key element.

The key is whether European public opinion and European leaders, meaning not only the EU leadership but also national leaders, will have the boldness to understand that we need a leap in who we are and how we act together. I believe we need a sort of refoundation of our identity: an understanding that we are out there, not alone, but as a convenient power for others who can join us on an agenda that is no longer the one of the last seven decades.

Several countries hold elections in 2027, and parties that are not pro-European could come to power. Could those elections undermine the political will to act together? Could a country such as France radically change its approach to European security?

Politics counts. The kind of leader sitting around the European Council table makes all the difference. We have lived through periods when we had the impression that whoever sat there did not really matter, because the EU would carry on anyway. We have learned, and risk learning the hard way, that politics counts and who sits there really makes a difference.

I believe that if Marine Le Pen is elected president of France next year, the European Union as such is at risk. Not only because of her agenda, but because it would create an environment within the Council, among the leaders of the member states, that leans increasingly towards a renationalisation of policies and a political agenda very close to the MAGA one, which bets on divisions.

In a system such as the EU, that agenda is completely counterproductive. I think the Italian government has found out first-hand how dangerous it can be to follow the MAGA agenda, for instance on migration. If your partners have the same approach as you, they will express no solidarity with you, because the principle is the lack of solidarity. It is counterproductive to your own interests.

If that principle, whether on the budget, migration, defence and security, trade or anything else, becomes the majority tendency, the mainstream within the institutions, then the disintegration of the Union might become real. Maybe not officially, but in practice.

The reason France is different from any other European country, and I believe more risky, is its presidential system. In Italy, we have a prime minister, a president and a constitution that is very clear about where Italy stands internationally and on European integration. In Germany, there is a system of checks and balances and a federal state, with a different organisation of the state.

In a presidential system, the power in the president’s hands is so great that such a shift could, I believe, seriously endanger the existence of the European integration process.

As a former Italian foreign minister, do you think Italy, even under the current centre-right coalition, could do anything to prevent that outcome? Or are we just bystanders?

I do not know. First of all, Italy will have elections too. So let us see.

If the current government continues, which is an “if”, we would first have to see whether it would share Le Pen’s agenda. That is not the Italian government’s current agenda, but with a French president on that side, its agenda might adapt.

The dynamics within the group, around the Council table, matter. Twenty-seven is a small group. Political families count, and the dynamics, especially among founding member states, create synergies that can shape the political mainstream.

The current Italian government takes one attitude towards the EU. In a year’s time, if it is still the same government, it remains to be seen whether that attitude would be the same.

That is one additional reason to hope France does not go that way. I think it would have a snowball effect on other capitals, which would feel freer to express strong anti-European feelings with an extremely anti-European French president at the table.

IEP Bocconi does not express opinions of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.

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