How Europeans can go beyond “limiting unpredictability” and respond to the MAGA doctrine
European leaders must draw up their alternative to the MAGA doctrine and drive deeper integration in the EU. A commentary by Catherine De Vries, and Ilke Toygür
Europe’s security and integration have been inextricably linked to America for decades. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the transatlantic alliance was not just a military arrangement but a political covenant grounded in the “liberal order”. NATO provided the security architecture, while the EU constructed the economic, political, and legal infrastructure of a peaceful, rules-based order in the continent. European countries flourished under this umbrella — they built robust welfare states and became the world’s largest trading bloc and America’s closest economic partner.
That geopolitical consensus is now history.
One year after the US presidential election, the Trump administration is not just disrupting transatlantic ties; it is redefining them around a different political idea. It is now clear that the MAGA movement is seeking to reorder the alliance via transnational political networks, selective media backing, political campaign coordination and, in some cases, direct electoral interference in allied democracies.
In Germany and Poland high-ranking officials from the US administration supported candidates closer to their political ideology. Far-right parties across the European continent increasingly operate as national branches of this broader ideological movement. This is not an episodic deviation; it is a systemic realignment.
What is striking is the lack of a coordinated European response. American political figures travel to European capitals to openly support far-right movements, but Europeans make no formal rebuttal, offer no narrative counter-offensive, and display little recognition of the scope of the challenge. While all this is happening in Europe, the administration is dismantling the pillars of democracy — such as judicial independence and press freedom — leading to democratic erosion in America as never before.
In many European capitals, leaders still appear caught between strategic dependence and political denial. Even when the US president claims that the EU was created to “screw the United States”, there is only silence — a silence that suits a president who prefers to “do business” with member states rather than EU institutions. European officials mostly focus on “limiting unpredictability” with the US, to use the phrase now common in diplomatic circles.
Europe’s leaders remain stuck in their path dependencies. They hope to keep America, their historical security provider, engaged for as long as possible. They are not yet ready to help Ukraine and face Russia alone. While smart diplomacy and calibrated give-and-take are necessary, leaders must identify the broader strategic imperative: the EU has to face the MAGA doctrine with its own alternative vision.
New Schengens
What alternative vision can supporters of the European integration project devise to take on the MAGA doctrine? The answer will define the course of Europe’s history.
Trump’s actions have already catalysed important steps in Europe in the realms of defence, technological sovereignty and supply chains. But any ambition for a strategically sovereign EU remains unevenly shared. Geography, ideology and history all shape how member states interpret the urgency.
Yet, precisely when unity is most needed, political fragmentation is growing. Far-right parties have entered government across Europe, expanded their presence in the European Parliament and remain extremely wary of further integrationist steps.
The EU must not allow itself to be paralysed by its slowest-moving parts, nor move according to Hungary’s national agenda.
Instead, flexible integration — using the treaty principle of enhanced cooperation — must become the norm. The creation of the Schengen area shows that this can work. It can become the new modus operandi, as long as at least nine member states take part.
Defending what is European
Defence is the clearest test case. As NATO’s reliability becomes contingent on political winds in Washington, the EU must invest in its own capacities. A group of countries is already working through a coalition of the willing, but this momentum must be institutionalised and fully resourced. Like Schengen, what begins as differentiated integration should gradually be folded into the EU’s formal architecture.
As historian Adam Tooze has pointed out, Europe’s defence problem is not one of resources. In 2024, European NATO members collectively spent $454bn on defence — far surpassing Russia’s expenditure. The continent fields 1.47 million active-duty personnel — more than the US. The problem is structural: a lack of strategic coordination, integration and coherent deployment across national lines. European defence industries are strong; they must now pursue complementarity rather than duplication.
But defence is only one part of a broader challenge. To build true strategic capacity, the EU must expand its budgetary firepower, overhaul its outdated fiscal rules, complete the capital markets union, and invest in critical cross-border infrastructure. These are not technocratic fixes. They are assertions of sovereignty — foundational steps toward a bloc capable of shaping its geopolitical future.
Building strategic capacity must be anchored by the EU’s political leadership — above all, the European Council and the European Commission — around the core principle of providing security and prosperity to European citizens. The EU should deliver European public goods that transcend borders: defence, energy, infrastructure, and investment. Member states should pool resources and commit to voluntary but binding mechanisms that enable collective action.
This approach does not erode national sovereignty. It builds a flexible European sovereignty: one that enhances each nation’s ability to act through shared strength.
But strategic capacity requires more than regulatory engineering. It requires political vision, democratic energy and ideological clarity. Pro-European leaders must start shaping the EU’s path, even if it means doing so with a smaller group of member states. They must offer a political answer to the Trump doctrine: one that makes a compelling case for democracy, pluralism and integration in a multipolar, unstable world.
A future worth choosing
The EU must articulate what it is for: a bold vision of what Europe can become without the crutch of American guardianship. This vision should not be defensive, but strategic — a future worth choosing.
Europeans must work out a political and policy response to the MAGA ideological doctrine. To endure the disruptions of the coming years, the EU must evolve beyond a common market and a web of treaties. It needs a vision for its own future. It must build strategic capacity at national and EU levels, and confront long-term challenges with coherence and credibility. It must assert itself as a strategic political actor in its own right.
The EU’s only path forward is to move from hesitation to decision — and to action.
This article was originally published on the European Council on Foreign Relations’ website
IEP@BU does not express opinions of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.
