Hungary’s Election Is a Test of Europe’s Capacity to Act
An Orbán victory would entrench veto politics, weakening the EU’s ability to act on foreign policy, defence and beyond. A commentary by Lorenzo Bini Smaghi
The elections due to take place on April 12 in Hungary carry fundamental importance for the European Union. A victory for Viktor Orbán’s party, in power for 16 years, would prolong the obstructionist stance he has adopted in European councils—particularly on issues requiring unanimity, such as foreign and defence policy.
The latest example concerns the €90bn aid package for Ukraine. Orbán declared himself opposed to Hungary’s participation in the new package, while not objecting to other countries proceeding—provided there were no financial burdens for Budapest.
Yet modifying EU budget procedures to avoid such burdens requires unanimous approval. At the European Council last March, the Hungarian prime minister vetoed precisely that change, thereby preventing other member states from moving forward.
In recent years Hungary has blocked a range of other decisions, including sanctions on Russia, aid to Georgia and Armenia, and the introduction of a global minimum tax on multinationals.
The Hungarian government’s positions have drawn praise from the Trump administration. At the inauguration of the Board of Peace, of which Orbán is a member, President Donald Trump publicly declared: “Viktor Orbán has my total and complete support for the election. Not everyone in Europe likes this endorsement, but that’s fine.”
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio was even more explicit—perhaps excessively so—stating at a recent meeting in Bucharest that “your success is our success.”
China, too, has long backed Orbán. President Xi Jinping has described the Hungarian prime minister as a “long-standing friend”, expressing gratitude for his consistent support of Beijing’s core interests—even under pressure from other western partners.
It is no coincidence that Hungary is the largest recipient of Chinese investment in Europe, particularly in electric vehicles and infrastructure linked to the Belt and Road Initiative.
Why do the US and China—strategic rivals, if not outright adversaries—both support the Hungarian prime minister ahead of these elections? Put differently, how can one remain aligned with two countries that openly compete on the global stage?
The most straightforward answer is that, through his veto power, Orbán represents an effective brake on European political integration—and can act as a lever to undermine the Union’s unity.
In the current geopolitical context, where power balances matter, it is entirely rational for both the US and China to seek to prevent Europe from strengthening and becoming more cohesive.
Given the size of its market, its geographical position and its institutional framework, Europe could stand on equal footing with the other two powers. It is not yet able to do so because, in key areas such as defence and foreign policy, it remains constrained by the veto powers of its member states—starting with Hungary.
It is no coincidence that when Trump advanced claims over Greenland last January, Orbán did not hesitate to say the issue was “not a European matter” and should be discussed solely between the two countries.
It is understandable that Trump’s United States and China support governments that oppose deeper European integration. From a European perspective, however, the benefits are far less clear—particularly for Hungarian citizens.
Over the past three years, Hungary’s economy has grown by just 0.2%, compared with 3% across the EU on average. Investment has fallen by 20%. Inflation stood at 4.5% last year.
Emigration is rising and the population is steadily declining. In global corruption rankings Hungary has slipped to 82nd place—the worst in the EU. The country ranks near the bottom of European tables for healthcare quality, press freedom and civil rights. Its simultaneous rapprochement with Washington and Beijing appears to have delivered little benefit to the Hungarian public.
For the EU’s other member states, the question is what advantage there is in having at the table a government that consistently says no—thereby preventing the Union from negotiating on equal terms with other major powers.
In other words, what interest is served by accommodating a partner that, ultimately, advances the interests of the US and China—and perhaps even Russia—before those of Europe?
A first version of this article was published in the Italian daily Il Foglio
IEP@BU does not express opinions of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.
