Nathalie Tocci’s Proposal for a European Security Council Is Gaining Traction

In her IEP Bocconi Policy Brief Towards a European Security Council, Nathalie Tocci, Senior Fellow at IEP Bocconi, argued that Europe needs a permanent framework to sustain strategic coordination in the face of Russian aggression and US disengagement.

That proposal is now gaining traction. In a recent and detailed article, Financial Times Europe Editor Ben Hall writes that the idea of a European Security Council is acquiring fresh momentum as Europe confronts two structural shifts: increasing US disengagement from the conventional defence of Europe, and the growing centrality of Ukraine to the continent’s security architecture.

The article notes that the proposal is no longer only a matter for think-tank discussion. Figures such as Michel Barnier and European Defence Commissioner Andrius Kubilius have brought versions of the idea back onto the policy agenda, while analysts including Luigi Scazzieri and Nathalie Tocci have explored why existing formats are no longer sufficient.

The point is not that Europe lacks institutions. It has many of them. The EU has taken once-unthinkable steps on defence, sanctions, energy security and support for Ukraine. NATO has reinforced deterrence on its eastern flank and has become more European in some operational respects. 

Yet Tocci’s argument is that neither framework has been able to solve the political problem at the core of European security: how to act decisively when the United States is less willing, or perhaps no longer willing, to provide political and strategic leadership.

The experience of recent crises has been revealing. Some of the most significant European action has not taken place inside formal EU or NATO structures, but through coalitions of willing and able countries. This has been true for Ukraine, where groups of European states have coordinated military and diplomatic responses to the changing US position. It has also been true in the case of Greenland, where European countries acted in solidarity with Denmark in a way that would have been difficult inside NATO, given the role of the United States, and cumbersome inside the EU. The Nordic-Baltic countries have also deepened their defence cooperation in response to the Russian threat.

These coalitions show that there is political energy in Europe. But they also reveal a weakness. Ad hoc formats work when leaders are focused on an immediate crisis. They are less effective in sustaining momentum between summits, preparing decisions, coordinating policy, and building habits of strategic cooperation. Tocci’s proposal starts precisely from this gap.

A European Security Council would not replace the EU or NATO. It would not by itself create a European defence union. Nor would it be a panacea. It would instead provide a permanent, light but structured framework for those European countries that share a convergent threat assessment and a commitment to defending Europe against Russia with much less American support, or perhaps even without it.

Its core membership would probably include large and medium-sized countries such as France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Poland, alongside smaller but strategically central countries such as Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Romania and the Baltic states. Italy and Spain would be involved because of their size and capabilities. EU institutions would also need to be present, including the Commission, the president of the European Council and the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU. Larger and more capable countries could have permanent seats, while smaller countries could participate on a rotational basis.

The crucial criterion, however, would not simply be size. It would be political alignment. Participants would need to share a serious assessment of the Russian threat and of the consequences of US disengagement. This would distinguish a European Security Council from existing institutions in which internal veto players can slow or dilute action. It would also allow Europe to include essential non-EU actors, above all the United Kingdom and Norway, and potentially to create a meaningful place for Ukraine short of EU membership.

The Financial Times article captures why the idea is gaining traction now: Europe needs a framework able to bridge institutional divides between the EU, NATO and non-EU European countries, while also accelerating strategic coordination. Tocci’s Policy Brief provides the underlying rationale. The issue is not to invent another talking shop. It is to institutionalize the political energy that has emerged in moments of crisis and make it durable.

A European Security Council would still face difficult questions: how its decisions would connect to EU and NATO structures; what role Turkey could play; how to balance permanent and rotating membership; and whether consensus would remain the default rule. But the direction of travel is increasingly clear.

If the Russian threat and US disengagement are structural phenomena, Europe needs a structure of its own capable of responding to them.

IEP@BU does not express opinions of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.

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