NATO’s Ankara Summit Is Defined by What Does Not Happen
Europe’s allies are trying to keep Trump quiet. But a more European NATO will soon force harder questions about power, responsibility and command. A commentary by Nathalie Tocci
This is a NATO summit where the non-news is the news. The Ankara programme has been pared to the bone: the less time available and the slimmer the final communiqué, the lower the risks. Not the risk, or worse the threat, of what enemies such as Vladimir Putin might do, but of what the “ally” Donald Trump might say.
Considerable effort has gone into avoiding that.
The US president wanted the European and Canadian allies to spend more on defence, and that is what they are doing. NATO secretary-general Mark Rutte has been trumpeting remarkable figures.
Excluding the United States, NATO countries have spent as much as $139bn more on defence over the past year. A large share of that spending is destined for US industry, creating almost 200,000 jobs in America. These numbers have been repeated ad nauseam at the summit, with one objective only: to placate Trump and make sure he does not lose control.
Few believe this will be enough to secure a real US commitment to defend European allies, should the need arise. And no one rules out that it might. All the more so if Ukraine becomes increasingly able to defend itself, producing a de facto freeze along the frontline.
Vladimir Putin, who cannot afford an end to a war on which the survival of his regime depends, could be tempted to drag the conflict elsewhere, perhaps by crossing into a NATO country. Few fully believe in the US commitment. At the very least, however, they hope for American silence, so as not to further encourage Putin to try his luck.
By the time these words are published, perhaps the danger will have passed and the Ankara summit will be drawing to a close without nasty surprises. That is probably what will happen.
But beyond the tragicomic spectacle, the real point lies elsewhere. It is certain that the United States wants to disengage from European security, significantly reducing its presence and commitment in Europe.
The fate of a much more Europeanised NATO is equally clear. If today the US provides roughly half of the conventional forces in Europe, it is plausible that within a few years that presence will be halved. Europeans will do the rest.
If everything goes according to plan, the reduction in the US conventional commitment will be gradual, while the American nuclear umbrella in Europe will remain intact. This is an optimistic scenario, but ultimately also a realistic one.
It would be a NATO perhaps weaker, but more European, and still strong enough to defend the continent against the Russian threat. That, in the end, is the objective, and that is what the work is focused on.
Two unresolved issues remain, however, and they threaten the future of the Alliance, even in this more Europeanised form.
The first would come to a head if Russia were actually to attack a NATO country in the coming months or years, risking a split within the Alliance.
If, for example, the Baltic states were attacked, not to mention Poland, whether directly or through a Russian hybrid attack that, deliberately or otherwise, caused civilian casualties, and if the United States were to wash its hands of the matter, it is very likely that Germany, where rearmament is real, would instead remain faithful to the commitment to collective defence.
If that happened, France and the United Kingdom would follow, which in turn would make it highly likely that other countries, including Italy, would join the collective effort. That would mark the end of NATO as an Atlantic alliance, but the survival of a European collective defence, including Canada and perhaps Turkey as well.
The second issue would come to a head in a less dramatic scenario. Kinetic war in Europe would not spill beyond Ukraine, but the conflict with Russia is destined to remain alive, continuing to push Europeans to assume growing responsibility for the defence of the continent.
Greater European defence responsibilities should be matched by greater European decision-making weight inside the Alliance. Put simply, a more Europeanised NATO would cease to be an organisation whose decisions are driven by the United States.
That is not Washington’s calculation today. Trump’s anger at European allies that set timid limits over the war in Iran, refusing to be dragged into it, reveals his underlying conviction, and not only his, that the United States is NATO’s majority shareholder. Rutte’s conspicuous subservience to Trump has only reinforced that conviction in Washington.
But if Europeans were one day truly to do the lion’s share within the Alliance, would the United States, whether led by Trump or by another president, really be willing to accept a European defence market less open to American industry?
Or that some of NATO’s operational decisions were no longer primarily wanted and led by the United States? If rights and responsibilities did not move in tandem, the organisation’s implicit social contract would risk cracking, if not breaking altogether.
When I raise this question with NATO colleagues, they acknowledge it, but shrug. After all, it is a problem that today almost looks like a luxury, and one that will arise tomorrow at most. And it will already be a miracle if the Alliance reaches that tomorrow intact.
A previous version of this article was published by the Italian daily La Stampa
IEP Bocconi does not express opinions of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.
