Pan-Regions and Trump’s Imperial Geography
Trump’s ambitions to extend U.S. influence over neighboring countries align with Karl Haushofer’s notorious geopolitical doctrine. A new global order is emerging, and Europe may not be part of it. A commentary by Andrea Colli
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Like his fellow supreme commanders, even US President Donald Trump, currently the head of the most powerful and still respected democracies in modern history, appears increasingly averse to the rule of international law and its defense through global governance institutions designed and implemented after the last global hegemonic conflict ended eight decades ago.
If one—for reasons ranging from political realism to transactional attitudes—starts despising the respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity of countries, even in the “name of the people,” they begin walking a dangerous path.
This is perilous for the company one joins and, as Gideon Rachman noted in the Financial Times, signals that Europe may have to defend liberal democracy without American support.
What is becoming evident today is that both superpowers and great powers (and even minor powers) are increasingly tempted by the old logic of territorial conquest, military force, or annexation at the expense of lesser entities.
Even though U.S. history, particularly in its early decades, is marked by purchases, annexations, and expropriations, the white knight of liberty displaying its lure for land-grabbing is objectively a boon for autocratic regimes inclined toward similar behavior.
Apart from providing ugly examples (or, for some, a convenient justification), the Trump administration is revitalizing many conceptual frames typical of old and new geopolitical thinking, starting from the President’s inaugural speech.
Pan-Regions Are Back
Trump’s latest contribution to the revival of geopolitics has been the revival of another almost forgotten concept (which, to be precise, he never mentions but practices extensively): that of the “pan-region.”
In the jargon of geopolitical analysis, the concept of the pan-region traces back to the interwar years, coined by a disillusioned and revanchist-minded German military officer turned professor of political geography, Karl Haushofer, whose assistant at Munich University was the Nazi leader Rudolf Hesse.
Haushofer drafted a geopolitical vision of the world divided into four pivotal regions, richly endowed with natural resources: Pan-America (the American Continent), East Asia (including Oceania and the Indian sub-continent), Pan-Russia (coinciding with the Soviet Asian landmass), and Eurafrica (including continental Europe and Africa).
Each pan-region was dominated—or soon to be dominated—by a great power: the U.S., Japan, the Soviet Union, and—in Haushofer’s (and soon, the Nazis’) view—Germany.
President Trump’s geopolitical remarks about Canada, Greenland, the Gulf of America, and Panama, not excluding the renaming of peaks in Alaska, if taken seriously, provide a concrete example of what building up a pan-region means: an area of at least sub-continental dimensions, rich in resources, demographically and economically robust, giving access to hotspots and crucial waterways, even in perspective, as the quickly melting Arctic Ocean. All in the function of economic prosperity, security, and enduring leadership in a future world order.
Likely (or maybe luckily), Mr. Trump has no idea of who Karl Haushofer (who committed suicide before being sent to the Nuremberg trials) was, who wrote, and inspired.
The Club of Imperial Powers
What is clear, however, is that a new political geography of the world is in sight. The kind of world order that will result is difficult to predict, but some features can be envisioned:
a) It will be radically different from the present one, now 80 years old, born in Bretton Woods, in 1944.
b) It will most likely be “imperial,” that is, made by super-great powers of imperial size, might, behavior, and attitudes, aiming to establish firm control over strategic “realms of power,” both geographic and immaterial.
c) It will very likely not be based on the respect of international law (at least, the one we know today) but on hard power, coercion, and the establishment of spheres of influence.
d) Hopefully, it will be a concerted one, that is, based on multilateral agreements among great powers outside of forms and institutions safeguarding the sovereignty of minor nations and their territorial integrity.
e) The club of imperial powers is easy to identify: an expanded United States, a unified "One China," and "Russland"—each a "hemispheric" superpower. Midsize powers such as India, Turkey, and Brazil may secure a seat at the table, but only at the discretion of the dominant hemispheric powers.
f) Such a club is not new in history: it was the power structure in post-Napoleonic Europe, named, indeed, the Concert of Europe. Ironically, however, most likely without Europe.
Concerting among imperial powers, however, is fascinating but not easy.
First, even the most long-lived autocrats eventually have to leave the seat of power, opening a transition process that is always risky.
Second, the relative balance of power among great powers is subject to change—as happened in Europe after the German Unification in 1870—opening the door to dangerous competition for leadership inside the club. Third, pan-regions are nice geopolitical “vignettes” that do not consider overlapping interests in key strategic areas—just to name one, the Indo-Pacific.
Ruling out the most important outcome of the tragedy of World War Two, that is, the inclusive and cooperative institutions of global governance based on mutual respect, is like opening, once again, Pandora’s box out of which only instability, fear, and violence will flow.
IEP@BU does not express opinions of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.