Policy Brief 56 - Towards a European Security Council

Executive summary 

Talk about Europe building its strategic autonomy has existed for the last quarter of a century. To date, existing institutions, including the EU and NATO, have not lived up to the promise despite the growing threat from Russia and the US disengagement from European security. Neither a European pillar in NATO nor EU defence have contributed significantly to a more autonomous Europe able to confront the threat from Russia with much less, or perhaps even without, America.  

Reason for hope and signs of courage and collective action exist. On some occasions, these stem from existing institutions, more often, they arise from outside. Individual European countries and groups have acted collectively and more autonomously on issues like Ukraine and Greenland, but they have often done so outside existing institutional structures. 

Both the EU and NATO may still find the scope and strength for renewal, and this should certainly be encouraged. Developing a European pillar within NATO and strengthening EU defence—especially in the areas of defence industry and hybrid threats—is both possible and desirable. Yet the fact that European collective action on security and defence has often taken place outside rather than within these organizations is revealing. 

The problem with coalitions of the willing and able, however, is that they are ad hoc, focused on specific issues at specific times. When political attention is high—as was the case when the US’s betrayal of Ukraine first became apparent in February 2025—heads of government meet at intervals of a few days. However, between one meeting and the next, attention wanes and the pace of work slows. Multilateralism and European integration have taught us that the essential work of institutions occurs between summits and not simply during these. 

It is likely with this intuition in mind that several European leaders have called for the institutionalization of such groups. In particular, the idea of a European Security Council, first emerged in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum, has regained currency.  

Based on the mobilization and dynamism seen over Ukraine, Greenland, and defence cooperation between Nordic-Baltic countries, the core of such a European Security Council would likely include large and medium-sized countries such as Germany, France, the UK, and Poland, as well as smaller ones like Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Other countries, such as Italy and Spain, would be involved mainly due to their size and relative capabilities. Presumably, larger and therefore more capable countries would hold permanent seats, as would EU institutions such as the Commission, the European Council president, and the member state holding the presidency of the EU Council. Smaller countries would participate on a rotational basis.  

But whether permanent or rotational, all would be united by a shared commitment to building European strategic autonomy, solidarity, and mutual assistance in the face of internal and external threats. Participation would require a convergent threat assessment and a shared goal of defending Europe against Russia with much less America. Given this strategic underpinning, the work of such a Council towards European autonomy would not be hampered from within—whether by the likes of Hungary and Slovakia in the EU or, indeed, the US in NATO. 

A European Security Council is no panacea. Consensus would presumably still be necessary, but compared to the European Council, a shared threat perception would presumably instil a greater sense of trust and shared destiny amongst its members. Its work would be linked to the strategic moment Europe is living through, but would not be exclusively connected to individual. Given that the threat from Russia and the disengagement of the US are structural phenomena, the European Security Council would presumably outlast the Ukraine war and Donald Trump.  

A European Security Council would also not, in itself, drive European defence integration, which would continue to require the EU. It would be a mechanism for stronger cooperation on defence industrial matters between groups of countries, and of greater coordination between them on security and defence policy. It would meet regularly, but also as and when need arises. And while it would retain a light institutional touch, it would require a secretariat because its very purpose is to maintain the momentum, capitalise on and make more long-lasting the work undertaken by ad hoc coalitions of the willing.