Policy Brief n.37 - How To Defend EUkraine: What are the Military Options
European countries should plan for a Peace Enforcement mission and prepare for either Non-Combat Security Assistance and Support or for Mobile Rapid Reaction Force in order to be prepared for a “what if conflict resumes”. A Policy Brief by Andrea Gilli, Mauro Gilli, and Niccolò Petrelli
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FileHow to Defend EUkraine (779.27 KB)
Executive Summary
Russia’s war in Ukraine, now in its third year, has prompted a twin debate in Europe, on the one hand over the military options to secure a peace and, on the other, over the defense policy alternatives to deter Moscow in the coming years. In both cases, the currently uncertain U.S. commitment to Europe represents a troubling background.2
The Trump administration’s push to broker a Russia-Ukraine peace deal, coupled with its decision to withhold temporarily military aid and intelligence from Kyiv, complicates Ukraine’s campaign and shifts the political and military burden to Europe. The crucial question is what Europe should do?
At the time of writing, negotiations on a, possibly temporary, ceasefire are ongoing. We outline and work around three scenarios: a stable peace emerges after the March 11 truce and is upheld by both parties; an intermediate case where Russia breaches the agreed deal, likely bringing back the use of military force between the two parties; and a worst-case scenario where no deal is reached, but since U.S. support remains absent, as fighting resumes, Europe finds itself in a more perilous situation.
As many numbers and options are surfacing and being discussed in the public debate, we identify nine possible military options for a European intervention, varying by engagement type (e.g., combat vs. non-combat, and so forth) posture (offensive vs. defensive), and scale (small to large).
These options include Special Forces (SF), Non-Combat Security Assistance and Support (NCS), Trip-Wire (TW), Air and Missile Defense (AD), No-Fly Zone (NFZ), Air-to-Ground Campaign (AGC), Peace-Enforcement (PE), Mobile Rapid Reaction Force (MRRF), and Combat-Ready Joint Deployment (CRJD). Considering this wide spectrum of options has two main benefits. On the one hand, it permits us to identify alternatives which are not being discussed. On the other hand, this permits us to consider options that may gain salience should fighting resume (as in two of our three scenarios).
We then assess the political and military feasibility and sustainability of these options through multiple parameters. Our analysis reveals four key insights.
Every option involves stark trade-offs. Special Forces deploy quickly but lack strategic impact; Trip-Wire and Combat-Ready Joint Deployment enhance deterrence but risk escalation; No-Fly Zone and Air and Missile Defense are more feasible but invite Russian provocations;
Some options are simply unfeasible at the moment, either militarily or politically. European countries, without the U.S. support, are highly unlikely to be able to conduct a Combat-Ready Joint Deployment. Others, such as the Trip-Wire, Air-to-Ground Campaign, and Special Forces are politically unsustainable as long as active combat still goes on– as many national electorates would not support them;
Options like Air and Missile Defense and Non-Combat Security Assistance and Support are feasible, but they should be assessed at the political level: what is the benefit for European countries to deliver them in-theater rather than continuing either to provide Ukraine with the hardware (AD) or providing this type of support from abroad (NCS);
Many options are scenario-specific. For instance, a Peace-Enforcement mission can work only after a peace agreement is reached, as the political bargain will define the rules of engagement. Analogously, Special Forces and Air-to-Ground Campaign are coercive options suitable in case either a peace deal is never reached or it is blatantly violated;
Russia’s escalation and provocations play a prominent role in all our options – European countries should seriously develop plans to tackle this issue.
Importantly, we have narrowed our analysis to the military realm for analytical reasons. However, policymakers should consider both the alternative and combined use of other instruments of power, like diplomacy, intelligence, or economic sanctions to achieve their goals. Somewhat related, our analysis is necessarily an approximation: more accurate numbers and predictions require detailed information either about the type of operations or the state of European armed forces that for different reasons are either not available or accessible.
We conclude with three main considerations.
First, Europe currently cannot pursue many of the options discussed – at least without the United States’s support.
Strategy is about prioritizing capabilities, but current capabilities’ shortfalls dramatically constrain Europe’s strategic options. Regardless of the options pursued (or not) in Ukraine, our analysis reveals the need to accelerate military modernization in Europe to address this major weakness.
Second, European countries can afford Peace-Enforcement, Non-Combat Security Assistance and Support and in part Mobile Rapid Reaction Force.
Ideally, Europe would pursue these three options simultaneously both to promote and enforce peace and deter against possible violations. However, this tripartite option is likely unfeasible.
We thus suggest that European countries plan for a Peace Enforcement mission and prepare for either Non-Combat Security Assistance and Support or for Mobile Rapid Reaction Force in order to be prepared for a “what if conflict resumes”.
Third, given the likely domestic opposition to many options discussed, European countries should probably try both to pursue a United Nations resolution to legitimize the Peace-Enforcement operation and to bring on board non-European countries like Australia or Japan, but especially from the so-called Global South: this would further legitimize their operation. Even if unsuccessful, these efforts would confirm before their electorates Russia’s intentions.
Europe’s military options vis-à-vis Ukraine should be developed along with its deterrence and defense posture. This is the purpose of the companion paper, which will be released soon.
IEP@BU does not express opinions of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.
