Greenland as a New Stress Test for the EU
Trump’s pressure on Greenland may have eased, but the crisis exposed the limits of the EU’s Arctic strategy and its struggle to act as a cohesive geopolitical player. A commentary by Andrea Colli, and Roberta D'Agostino
A month after global leaders convened in the Swiss Alps for the World Economic Forum, US ambitions over Greenland seem to have temporarily cooled down. The framework agreement announced in Davos by NATO Secretary General Rutte and US President Trump has apparently defused the crisis.
What remains after the Greenland panic is an Arctic region dominated by a delicate equilibrium, with a lot of uncertainty persisting around the agreed deal.
With Russia pursuing its military buildup and China expanding its Arctic ambitions through projects within the Polar Silk Road, it is clear that the region has become an arena of competing national interests where the logic of Arctic exceptionalism no longer applies.
The area has now become a contested space where melting ice shapes security interests and geopolitical ambitions.
Although tensions have been frozen for the moment, the Greenland crisis is far from being fully over and skepticism surrounding the agreement persists. In addition, the crisis exposed the EU’s vulnerabilities in the Arctic region and raised questions about its role as an influential political actor.
First of all, American intentions over the island have questioned the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a “friendly” State - Denmark - which is part of the EU and belongs to NATO.
Therefore, while the prospect of a deal favours de-escalation amid strained US-EU relations, the Greenland crisis serves as a catalyst for a rethinking of the Union’s role. Indeed, it forces the EU to rethink its global standing within an increasingly competitive international environment and an unpredictable transatlantic partnership.
On one hand, US President Donald Trump’s threats to acquire Greenland further exposed the limits of the EU’s 2021 Arctic policy that remains short-sighted about the evolution of the regional context and which is now under review with Member States.
As a matter of fact, the EU has been present in the Arctic since the early 2000s, although European commitment in the area remains grounded in the protection of the environment, sustainable development and stability and regional cooperation.
As recently acknowledged by EU leaders, the European strategy for the Arctic is no longer fit for a region that has been significantly altered by climate-related transformations - including new shipping routes and the race for critical raw materials.
In its original formulation, the strategy is missing a security dimension that takes into consideration the evolving security landscape and the intensifying geopolitical rivalry especially after four years into the Russia-Ukraine war.
Accordingly, the lack of responsiveness in updating the strategy highlights Europe’s structural inability to manage geopolitical dynamics as a unified bloc, particularly for those issues that fall under the security and defense policy umbrella as the latter rests with Member States.
Therefore, it is imperative to acknowledge that the European group of 27 cannot continue to be understood solely as an economic space and that cohesion should expand beyond the logic of market integration to encompass foreign policy issues as well.
As the world order is progressively sliding towards a bipolar system where the role of the two dominant poles - the US and China - is counterbalanced by a number of influential middle powers, the EU should rethink its posture vis-à-vis external players.
In such an evolving global order, the principle that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts seems to acquire greater emphasis. From this perspective, if Europe is to retain influence, it must overcome internal disagreements and conceive itself as a cohesive political actor able to translate its power into coordinated external action.
To avoid falling into the Thucydidean logic whereby the EU actions of the smallest actors are constrained against the power of the greatest, enhanced cooperation with like-minded countries is required so as not to find themselves “on the menu”, to quote the words of Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney.
Therefore, as a middle power, the EU should pursue a strategy of closer cooperation with other actors that are politically and economically aligned with the Union. In turn, this would strengthen the bloc’s position within an increasingly multipolar environment.
Therefore, while the island sits thousands of kilometres away from European soil, President Trump’s coercive actions produced significant implications for the EU.
In the Arctic context, the idea of middle powers cooperation for security reasons may translate into enhanced collaboration within the framework of existing initiatives, such as the Security and Defence Partnership which is already in place with countries like Canada.
Most importantly, this type of activity could also represent a valid alternative to a NATO-led initiative which, by contrast, would risk further antagonizing Russia and exacerbating regional geopolitical competition amid greater unpredictability along the Washington-Brussels axis.
The Greenland crisis highlights some existing structural limitations that compel EU’s actions at the international level - first and foremost the absence of a unified voice in response to crises. It is clear that the emerging world order leaves little room for internal fragmentation, which derives from the EU’s inherent nature as a union of 27 different Member States.
At the same time, the Greenland crisis can be seen as another stress test, urging European leaders to recognise the limitations of fragmented efforts and to promote greater internal cohesion.
Finally, it underscores that the Union’s influence in the contemporary international system depends on acting as a harmonised bloc. By strengthening its engagement with like-minded partners, the EU can transform these structural vulnerabilities into strategic opportunities.
This in turn would allow for better adaptation to this new multipolar world order and promote a more suitable approach in addressing the risks associated with increasingly uncertain US-EU relations.
IEP@BU does not express opinions of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.
