It is (Once Again) Time to Think Long Term About EU Energy Security
As long as Europe’s economy is fossil dependent the continent will be vulnerable to energy shocks. A commentary by J.Christopher Proctor, and Romain Svartzman
Four years ago the Russian full scale invasion of Ukraine set off an energy crisis in Europe. Now the United States and Israel’s attack on Iran have once again scrambled global energy markets, placing Europe at risk of another energy crunch.
The EU did not start this war, but the more it escalates the more likely it seems that Europe will pay an economic cost as the production and shipping of oil and natural gas are disrupted across the Middle East. Indeed, it seems likely that the war will have a harsher economic impact on Europe than on the United States, which is itself a major fossil fuel producer.
In response to the 2022 energy crisis, the EU adopted the REPowerEU plan which was intended to coordinate a strategy towards saving energy, producing clean energy and diversifying the EU’s supply of energy.
On one count the EU’s response worked quite well: energy dependence on Russia has collapsed. The EU now imports very little (if any) oil from Russia – a huge change from just four years ago – as this decline has been offset by increased imports from countries such as Kazakhstan, Norway and the United States. Russian gas has also largely been offset, replaced largely by gas from Norway and liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the United States.
Source: European Council
The European energy system is more diverse than ever, but it is still vulnerable. Fossil fuels are bought and sold on global markets, and energy which is currently sent to Europe can just as easily go elsewhere for a higher price. This was made clear enough this week when an oil taker heading from Nigeria to France, 6000 kilometers from Iran, turned around to head towards Asia instead.
As long as Europe’s economy is fossil dependent the continent will be vulnerable to these kinds of external shocks. The only way to really achieve energy security in Europe is with renewables which do not require constant inflows of imported resources to operate.
The idea that renewable energy can give the EU energy stability is not new or radical. Again, it was a key part of the 2022 REPowerEU. Unfortunately, last time around the EU did not manage to change the trajectory of the energy transition in response to the crisis. As shown in the chart below, while REPowerEU called for a sharp increase in the share of renewables in European energy consumption, the actual data for 2023 and 2024 essentially followed the existing trend.
Source: Pavlenko and Cherp 2025
What Europe did manage to do was spend big on fossil fuel subsidies, with expenditures from crisis-specific measures estimated at €187 billion in 2022 and €145 billion in 2023. For context, Europe spent around €100 billion on renewable energy investments in 2023. These subsidies were an expensive short term solution that did little, if anything, to improve the situation we are facing just four years later.
Long term thinking now, by going big and fast on renewables and electrification, can save us a similar expensive short term solution when the next energy crisis arrives, whether it comes from an attack on Iran, an invasion of Greenland, or some other geopolitical crisis outside of Europe’s immediate control.
To be sure, the path toward such energy independence – rooted in both renewable and nuclear power, along with energy efficiency – is not an easy one. It requires developing technologies currently dominated by other nations, most notably China, which controls the global supply chain for key components like solar panels and lithium-ion batteries, as well as the refining of critical minerals essential for both sectors.
It also demands a fundamental rethinking of electricity pricing, specifically the "merit-order effect," to ensure that volatile marginal costs, such as those from gas, do not destabilize the entire market during crises. Despite these hurdles, this strategy remains the most sensible pathway to achieving long-term energy resilience and price stability.
IEP@BU does not express opinions of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.
