Policy Brief n.52 - Per Aspera ad Astra: Undersea Cables, Satellites for Telecommunications and the European Strategic Autonomy

Digital technologies have become the core enabler of social interactions, economic transactions and security dynamics around the world. Europe currently lags behind in core digital or digital-enabling technologies, from rare earths production to semiconductors design and manufacturing capabilities to big tech enterprise software.  

Europe, however, is also increasingly vulnerable when it comes to connectivity, the arteries underlying digitalization. In particular, its undersea cables transporting data across the Atlantic Ocean, the Northern, Baltic and Mediterranean Seas are increasingly vulnerable to Russian sabotage.  

In outer space, Europe is either seeing its satellites becoming more vulnerable to a wide spectrum of adversarial capabilities (from cyberattacks to jamming) or is becoming more dependent on foreign solutions, like Elon Musk’s Starlink low-Earth orbit (LEO) communication satellites constellation.  

Undersea cables and communication satellites are generally treated separately. In this Policy Brief, we consider them together, looking at how these two infrastructures can support each other for the purpose of strengthening Europe’s sovereignty, resilience and security. In our analysis, we first identify three key trends.  

Undersea cables will continue to carry most intercontinental data across the Atlantic – at least for the foreseeable future. Protecting undersea cables is, however, expensive and subjected to diminishing marginal returns given the size of the areas and the multiple types of threats they face.  

Finally, LEO communication satellite constellations will experience a massive growth of their capacity; however, given the overall increase in data transfer, LEO communication will remain an important, but minor, part of the data transmission infrastructure.  

Second, we derive a set of considerations. Given their large domestic contracts, supply- and demand-side economies of scale they enjoy, and the technological advantage they possess (from launchers to satellite manufacturing), U.S. companies like Starlink or Amazon Leo (formerly Project Kuiper) are likely to maintain a quasi-monopolistic position for the near future in LEO communication satellites.  

Thus, European LEO projects – more prominently, the EU flagship project IRIS² (Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnectivity and Security by Satellite) – have zero chances of successfully competing commercially. For, IRIS² should be transitioned to strategic tools for governments, militaries, and crisis situations.  

Even if the capacity is limited compared with US and Chinese competitors, it is more than enough to keep essential national functions online.  

Along with continuing monitoring and protection of undersea cables, the EU should also invest in hybrid cable-satellite system architecture that can switch automatically when cables fail, following progress achieved by NATO-led HEIST project (Hybrid Space/Submarine Architecture Ensuring Infosec of Telecommunications).  

These steps would make Europe far more resilient, improving security, strategic autonomy as well innovation and cooperation among EU Member states.