Russia Does Not Need a Military Victory to Defeat Europe
As Moscow struggles in Ukraine, it is exploiting political divisions across Europe. Rearmament alone cannot stop a strategy designed to break the continent’s will to resist. A commentary by Nathalie Tocci
This commentary forms part of the IEP Defence Research Group, an interdisciplinary task force working on the evolving European security and defence architecture, one of the key topics of the IEP 2026-27 annual cycle. The results of the analysis of the group will be published as an IEP report
Russia’s war against Europe is fought on three fronts. It is a military war, which grinds on in Ukraine. It is a hybrid war, waged especially – but not exclusively – in Europe’s north and east. And it is a political and cognitive war targeting the entire continent, with a particular focus on central, western and southern European countries. Russia’s military strategy has occupied centre stage in diplomacy and in the media.
Seeking ways to end the war in Ukraine is critical, given the death and destruction Russia has sown in the country. However, Russia’s hybrid and cognitive means of war are far more effective than its military strategy. Vladimir Putin’s imperial designs are floundering militarily in Ukraine, but risk being resurrected by successes elsewhere.
As Russia’s military advances in Ukraine have slowed, almost grinding to a halt, and its casualties continue to mount – with staggering figures now surpassing one and a half million – Putin’s war machine is both digging in its heels and adapting. Russia is entrenching itself in Ukraine.
Yes, Ukraine has made formidable strides, especially in its drone capabilities, but Russia also continues to invest and innovate. It is a far more capable military power now than it was five years ago, before its large-scale invasion began. Wars on the battlefield are unpredictable, and I will certainly not attempt a prediction here.
What can be said, however, is that a continuation of the military stalemate that has characterised the war since 2023 is plausible in the months ahead.
Russia’s escalating hybrid war
While Russia’s military performance is lacklustre at best, the other pillars of its war strategy are far more effective.
Faced with an enduring war of attrition in Ukraine, Russia is now upping the ante in its hybrid war in Europe, focusing its attacks on northern and eastern European countries.
We cannot rule out that these might eventually spill over into conventional war. This could happen directly, with Russia making a move on Narva in Estonia, or orchestrating a false-flag operation along the Suwałki Gap and then moving in to cut off the Baltic states from Poland. More likely – not least given that scenarios like these have been war-gamed ad nauseam – is a hybrid attack on a European country that, intentionally or not, causes civilian casualties.
This would trigger a European response, followed by a Russian counter-response, which could spiral into confrontation and open a new front in Russia’s war against Europe.
European governments, militaries, ministries and intelligence services, all the way down to public opinion, are not just more aware of Russia’s hybrid warfare. They are also better prepared for it.
Russia’s attacks, from cyber operations to sabotage, from drone incursions to strikes on critical infrastructure, are escalating. But Europeans have upped their game too. They have become more effective at preventing and foiling such attacks, as well as at withstanding and adapting to them when they occur.
Europe’s peacetime mindset
What Europeans are not doing is playing offence. This is largely because the norms, rules and procedures under which they operate do not allow it. A first explanation is that democracies are bound by the rule of law in ways that a dictatorship like Russia is not. True as this is, there is more to it.
Ukraine is a democracy, and yet it has learned to play offence. Its growing technological and military prowess is testament to this. The difference is that Ukraine knows it is at war, while other European countries do not recognise that they are too. And in war, rules still apply, but they differ from those that prevail in peacetime.
When lives are on the line, complex procurement rules are scrapped and military units can communicate directly with, and procure directly from, defence start-ups. This injects a dynamism, speed and innovation that European institutions and industries simply lack.
I recently met Iryna Terekh, CEO of Fire Point, a Ukrainian defence company whose drones and missiles are responsible for many of the long-range strikes inside Russia.
Four and a half years ago, Fire Point did not exist, and Iryna was a young professional working in urban architecture. She stresses the nexus between speed, innovation and humility.
A defence sector – and a society – capable of fighting wars requires rapid adaptation to battlefield realities. And speed comes with humility: the openness to recognise mistakes, to challenge oneself and to innovate as the only way to survive.
The reality of war deflates egos and spurs radical change. This is what is often missing in the rest of Europe – not least because there is no open, official recognition that Europe is at war.
The very term “hybrid war” obscures reality. Hybrid war is set against actual war; it is abstract and intangible.
European societies, especially those far from the front line, do not feel the hybrid war – even when sabotage causes an explosion in an Italian weapons factory, a drone with explosives is found at Leipzig airport, and cyberattacks on European companies, public administrations and citizens escalate daily.
War is felt even less when European leaders tirelessly tell their citizens that Europe is not at war with Russia.
Europe does not want to be at war with Russia. But Russia is at war with Europe, and acts accordingly. Until that is recognised, European countries will continue to be attacked and will defend themselves with one hand tied behind their back. And investing in defence, especially in countries further from Russia, will remain hard to justify to war-weary publics.
Russia’s war on European minds
This leads to the third, and most effective, leg of Russia’s strategy: its political and psychological war on Europe.
Cognitive warfare – fought through propaganda and disinformation, and amplified exponentially through social media – aims to sow resentment and mistrust: mistrust among members of society, mistrust of institutions at both national and European level, and mistrust between European countries.
Mistrust and resentment breed division, and division impedes cooperation, let alone integration, in Europe. The rise of parties of the far right and the populist left across European countries points precisely to this.
Russia wants to re-establish its imperial grip on eastern Europe. It does not necessarily want to invade other European countries militarily. The economic and human costs may be bearable for Putin, but they are nonetheless exceedingly high, even for Moscow.
If it can achieve its imperial designs by politically subjugating eastern Europe and inducing western Europe to look the other way, it will have reached its goal on the cheap.
Building societal resilience and preparedness – and therefore withstanding Russia’s psychological warfare – is easier in northern and eastern Europe.
While tens of thousands of Estonian volunteers regularly train for a potential Russian attack, Italians are anaesthetised by TV talk shows thoroughly infiltrated by Russian propagandists.
But Estonians are not inherently wiser than Italians. They are simply closer to Russia. Withstanding propaganda and disinformation is harder the further citizens feel from actual war.
Russia’s cognitive war is being fought across the European continent, and in some countries it is making more headway than in others. Moscow’s imperial ambitions are concentrated on eastern Europe, but to realise them it is counting on western and southern Europe to look the other way.
Much will depend on European politics, with crucial elections coming up in major European countries in 2027.
Europe’s military rearmament is concentrated in the north and east. But unless cognitive resilience is built in the west and south of Europe too, Russia may end up losing the military confrontation, but succeed in winning the war.
IEP Bocconi does not express opinions of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.
