The Trump-Xi Meeting and America’s Failure to Contain China
From trade wars to the Middle East, Washington’s strategy has exposed the limits of US power — and left Europe facing a more dangerous geopolitical landscape. A commentary by Nathalie Tocci
If the first Trump administration marked the beginning of the rivalry between the United States and China, the second was supposed to sanction American supremacy.
The opposite is happening instead, as will probably emerge from the meeting between President Donald Trump and his counterpart Xi Jinping in Beijing. These are the two wars launched by Trump and lost against China: the trade war and the one in the Middle East.
The rivalry with Beijing, which was undoubtedly one of the defining features of Trump’s first term, seemed destined for dramatic escalation when the American president, on the so-called “liberation day”, announced tariffs of 145 per cent on Chinese imports.
But Trump earned the nickname “Taco” (“Trump always chickens out”) when Xi ordered restrictions on exports of critical minerals, especially rare earths, over which China holds a monopoly. Markets collapsed and, within a few weeks, several American industries found themselves unable to operate at full capacity.
After a few weeks, Trump lowered the tariffs. Duties on Chinese products remain higher than in the past, but they have neither bent the Chinese economy — which continues to record a significant trade surplus — nor triggered the reshoring of manufacturing industries to the United States.
The brief US-China trade war brought to the surface what many suspected: we already live in a bipolar world, in which a substantial economic and technological parity between the two powers prevents either side from prevailing over the other, contrary to what Trump evidently thought.
Just as the trade war highlighted the balance of power between the United States and China, the conflict in the Middle East revealed America’s strategic vulnerabilities.
After the blitz in Venezuela — which, in the Western collective imagination, had deprived China of a strategic and energy partner — the war against Iran and the overthrow of the Islamic Republic were also supposed to deal a severe blow to Beijing.
As is well known, things did not go according to plan, yet Washington continued to hope otherwise.
After all, a large share of the oil and liquefied natural gas passing through the Strait of Hormuz is destined for China.
In the US-China rivalry, which is also being played out on the energy front, even a longer-than-expected war in the Middle East — including through an American counter-blockade of the Strait — could have advantaged Washington over Beijing.
But here too Trump miscalculated, not only because China has sufficient oil reserves to withstand several months of disruption, but because Beijing is likely to emerge strengthened from the Middle Eastern conflict. The militarisation of fossil fuel markets will only accelerate the energy transition.
For both Europe and Asia, both net importers of hydrocarbons, the energy transition is not an ideological whim, but a security strategy. And above all, with a distracted Europe — where some have stubbornly dismissed the Green Deal as an ideological project in recent years — China, which has not been distracted and has instead turned the situation to its advantage, stands to gain. Demand for solar panels, batteries, electric cars and much more is destined to grow.
The US-China summit had been scheduled for last month, but was postponed because of the war in the Middle East. Trump was convinced that by mid-May everything would be over.
Instead, we still find ourselves with the Strait closed and an American president effectively humiliated by a weak, isolated and despised Iranian regime that nevertheless managed to exploit its asymmetric advantages and has no intention of backing down.
Trump goes to Beijing to negotiate. And Beijing will probably be willing to grant a few crumbs that the American president can claim as victories: purchases of soybeans, gas, aircraft, or Chinese investments in America.
But in substance, Xi will concede little or nothing of what Trump expects, starting with Chinese pressure on Iran. And in return, Beijing will expect American concessions on Taiwan.
For Beijing, it is enough that Trump — careless and ignorant of details — ignores what are only apparently semantic nuances: the shift from implicit American support for Taiwan’s independence to explicit opposition. Trifles for Trump, but a strategic victory for Xi within his long-term expansionist plans.
Last but not least: what does all this mean for us Europeans?
Trump’s unpopularity in Europe, fuelled at least in part by the American president’s manifest contempt for the Old Continent, could mislead us. A US-China summit advantageous to China should not make us smile. In international relations — and not only there — the enemy of my enemy is not always my friend.
There are serious reasons why Europe should keep its guard up with regard to Beijing.
While recognising that cooperation with China is necessary, and that it is certainly impossible to be simultaneously in conflict with Putin, Trump and Xi, we should not forget that if we want to assert ourselves as an autonomous and mature actor, the solution is not to escape an overbearing parent only to throw ourselves naively into the arms of the interested accomplice.
A previous version of this article was published by the Italian daily La Stampa
IEP@BU does not express opinions of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.
