Trump’s Iran Gamble Leaves Washington with a Worse Deal
An urgent push for peace risks locking the US into terms less favourable than those available before the war. A commentary by Nathalie Tocci
Between the lines of the threats and the frenetic stream of posts at every hour of the day – and especially at night – one can discern Donald Trump’s desperate desire to reach an agreement that would bring an end to the war waged by the United States and Israel against Iran.
Yet it is precisely the American president’s words, and his evident inability to grasp Tehran’s dynamics, that make this objective difficult to achieve.
With the ceasefire in Iran, followed by that in Lebanon, and the attempt to successfully conclude talks between Washington and Tehran in Islamabad, Trump has acted on the assumption that a more advantageous agreement for the United States could only be achieved by raising the stakes.
He has likely done so because he knows – despite his claims to the contrary – that the parameters of a possible compromise are now far less favourable than they were at the beginning of the year, before the joint US-Israeli attack, when the parties were negotiating in Geneva.
At the start of 2026, Washington insisted it would not yield an inch from its demands: the complete elimination of uranium enrichment, the end of Iran’s missile programme and the cessation of support for pro-Iranian militias.
These demands were accompanied by the implicit threat of regime change in Tehran, set against the backdrop of protests brutally repressed by Iran’s security apparatus.
In reality, these were maximalist positions that, combined with the US military build-up in the Gulf, betrayed the bad faith of Trump’s usual pair of negotiators – envoy Steve Witkoff and the president’s son-in-law Jared Kushner – in Geneva.
But regardless of the White House’s true intentions, those were the demands on the table.
In Islamabad, by contrast, there is no longer any talk of Iranian missiles or militias.
Regime change in Tehran is off the table.
The discussion now centres on a time limit for uranium enrichment: Iran is pushing for a five-year cap, while the United States would prefer twenty or more.
Negotiations also extend to the well-known 440 kilograms of enriched uranium at levels sufficient to enable the construction of several nuclear devices – which Trump deliberately downplays as “nuclear dust” – with Iran insisting on dilution to levels compatible with a civilian programme, while Washington would seek its removal from the country.
Even if an agreement were reached on the nuclear issue closer to US than Iranian positions, its parameters would not be substantially different from those of the 2015 deal – the very one Trump denounced and then dismantled.
Finally, there is discussion of reopening the Strait of Hormuz and a possible toll system benefiting Iran, an issue entirely absent in January, when the Strait was fully open and which Trump himself triggered through the war.
Even here, it is difficult to imagine that any eventual agreement would include concessions to Iran on Hormuz that would have been unthinkable before the conflict.
In short: Trump is desperately seeking a deal, but the only available compromise is far less advantageous for Washington than what could have been secured before the war.
A strategic failure by any measure.
If Trump senses this, it may explain why, the more desperate his desire for peace becomes, the more he responds by escalating.
Iran’s blockade of Hormuz was met with a US counter-blockade.
As the temporary ceasefire in Iran approached its expiry, the president’s threats to strike civilian infrastructure in the country resurfaced, raising the prospect of war crimes.
Nor are there shortages of posts in which Trump emphasises Iran’s weakness – clearly to mask his own.
The ceasefire in Lebanon, meanwhile, stands as an unexpected demonstration of precisely that weakness.
When, two weeks ago, the temporary truce in Iran was announced and Israel attempted to derail it by killing more than 350 Lebanese, Trump once again appeared accommodating towards Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
But when Iran set clear conditions, refusing to reopen Hormuz without a ceasefire in Lebanon as well, Trump was forced to impose a halt on Netanyahu.
The United States then activated its counter-blockade in Hormuz, and the standoff in the Strait continues.
The Iranians, however, are convinced not only that they have a higher pain threshold than the United States, but also that they still hold cards to play – above all the possible closure of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait in the Red Sea by the Houthis.
US escalation has so far only triggered a further vicious cycle of Iranian escalation.
And despite its military inferiority, the regime in Tehran continues to act with the apparent conviction that it is more resilient than Washington.
As you read these lines, the talks in Islamabad may once again have collapsed with a resumption of hostilities, or the ceasefire may have been extended and negotiations may continue.
It depends on which prevails: Trump’s desperate desire to end the conflict, or the self-defeating tactics that are fuelling its continuation.
A previous version of this article was published by the Italian daily La Stampa
IEP@BU does not express opinions of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.
