Trump’s Iran War is Faltering, but Europe Has yet to Grasp It
As the conflict spirals beyond control, Washington struggles to rally allies while Europe hesitates between caution and dependence. A commentary by Nathalie Tocci
The US-Israeli war against Iran is not unfolding as President Donald Trump had anticipated. The escalation and prolongation of the conflict were predictable to anyone familiar with the Middle East.
Even more predictable is the way in which Trump — influenced by Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and constrained by his own narcissism — is reacting: by issuing new threats in an attempt to draw European and Asian allies, as well as China, into a war that is not theirs.
Trump had once aspired to win a Nobel Peace Prize. Instead, he has become entangled in a war that risks slipping out of control by the day.
He had been searching for an Iranian equivalent of Delcy Rodríguez, but has instead found himself — for now — facing Mojtaba Khamenei and a regime in Tehran that is more hardened and more hostile towards the United States and Israel.
He had promised to bring down inflation and reduce the cost of living for American citizens, but is instead driving oil prices sharply higher, triggering an unprecedented crisis in energy and commodity markets.
He had aimed to compete with China by asserting the United States as the leading global power, yet now finds himself compelled to seek Beijing’s assistance. All this is being pursued through a war that is illegal, elective and poorly planned — and, as expected, is veering off course.
So far, the picture is relatively clear. Equally clear is Trump’s approach towards European and Asian allies. He knows that the United States cannot reopen the Strait of Hormuz.
Attempts to provide insurance guarantees and military escorts to shipping have little chance of success: as long as hostilities continue, such measures are bound to fail.
Ships will simply refuse to take the risk of transiting the strait, and the energy and trade crisis will persist. Iran does not need to exercise full control over Hormuz, nor openly threaten attacks on vessels passing without its consent: the mere possibility is enough to deter any rational actor.
Washington therefore cannot be unaware that even if allies were to deploy warships and military units along the strait, the underlying situation would not change.
A broader naval deployment might ease pressure on the US navy, currently engaged in intercepting Iranian missiles and drones in the Gulf, but it would not alter the fundamental equation: the Strait of Hormuz would remain effectively closed.
This is Iran’s asymmetric advantage — the weaker party in the conflict, but not therefore a losing one.
Why, then, has Trump called for the intervention of European and Asian countries?
Simply to draw them into a conflict that is heading in the wrong direction, thereby sharing costs, outcomes and responsibilities. Trump is already retreating from the grand objectives proclaimed in the early hours of the US-Israeli military strikes.
He no longer speaks of regime change, nor does he repeat that the war will end with Tehran’s unconditional surrender.
There is less talk of the total destruction of Iran’s drone arsenal, and more focus on the more attainable goal of degrading its naval missile capabilities. This colossal failure is one Trump would prefer to share with others.
In his ideal scenario, Trump would also share with China the burden of a possible reversal in Iran. He has therefore asked Beijing to deploy naval forces in the Strait of Hormuz, overlooking the fact that Iranian oil continues to flow to China.
He has hinted that he might postpone a planned meeting with Chinese president Xi Jinping later this month, though it is difficult to imagine the choreography of a US-China summit in the midst of such a war.
Yet Trump cannot fail to understand that, at this juncture, it is he who needs Xi — not the other way around. If this were not already clear, Beijing has made its position plain: if Washington wants to ensure safe passage through Hormuz, it should end the war.
As in the case of Ukraine, where Europeans rightly argue that the quickest and most just way to end the conflict is for the aggressor — Russia — to withdraw, the same principle applies today to the United States and Israel in Iran.
In response to Trump’s request — accompanied by the explicit threat that Nato would bear the cost if allies failed to come to Washington’s aid — the countries directly concerned have drawn a red line.
The UK has made clear it does not wish to be dragged into war, while Germany, France and Japan have stated that they will not deploy warships or military forces to Hormuz. Yet there has been no unequivocal and unified rejection.
The European Union continues to entertain the idea of expanding its Aspides naval operation in the Red Sea — an operation that has failed even to stop Houthi attacks, which were halted only by the Gaza ceasefire, let alone ensure security in Hormuz.
In all likelihood, and for good reason, nothing will come of it. Europeans are timid in the face of Washington and increasingly detached from the principles of international law and from a clear understanding of their own interests. But they have not (yet) become entirely irrational.
What is becoming evident to all is that Trump’s threats towards Europe are hollow: both because Washington’s breach of trust has already occurred, and because, in the eyes of the world — Europe included — the emperor in Washington has no clothes.
A previous version of this article was published by the Italian daily La Stampa
IEP@BU does not express opinions of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.
