Ukraine: Trump’s Return Has Prolonged an Imperial War
With Washington’s policy shift, the prospect of a negotiated end has receded and the war has grown longer and more violent. A commentary by Nathalie Tocci
Four years have passed since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and twelve since the war began with the annexation of Crimea and Moscow’s assault in Donbas.
It is the longest and bloodiest war in Europe since the Second World War. Soldiers and civilians have died in staggering numbers — estimates suggest around two million casualties.
How much longer it will last depends on how quickly the resources available to the only person who can end it, Russian president Vladimir Putin, are exhausted.
One thing, however, is clear: Donald Trump’s return to the White House has probably prolonged the war — and certainly made it more violent.
The war in Ukraine is not difficult to understand. Donbas, Nato’s eastward enlargement, linguistic minorities — these are arguments used as mirrors for Russian propaganda, echoed in media and institutions. At its core lies Putin’s obsession with reconstructing a lost empire. And imperial wars, unlike civil conflicts, end only with the victory or defeat of one side. Colonisation either happens or it does not. There are no halfway outcomes. This is not a wish; it is an analytical observation.
For Moscow, the war has not gone well. In 2014, within months, Russia occupied 14 per cent of Ukrainian territory at minimal cost and with negligible sanctions from the international community.
Over the past four years, however, it has conquered only an additional 6 per cent. In the past 12 months, advances have amounted to barely 1 per cent. Meanwhile, Moscow loses between 30,000 and 40,000 soldiers each month. The Russian economy — excluding the military sector — is undergoing near de-industrialisation.
Oil prices, which in the early years of the war sustained the economy with peaks above $100 a barrel, now hover around $60, without counting the discounts imposed on Russian crude sold mainly to China and India. Gas flows to Europe have all but ceased. Revenues from LNG compensate for only a fraction of the losses.
If Putin hoped to turn Ukraine into a springboard for even more ambitious imperial designs, events have not unfolded as planned. Yet he cannot change course. The continuation of the war has become essential to the survival of his regime.
Were the conflict to end today, Putin could not claim victory. The war economy would falter and the regime would likely implode. If you stop pedalling, the bicycle falls. The war in Ukraine will end only when, one day, Russia’s bicycle falls.
Ukraine, however, is suffering. Hundreds of thousands of casualties, around seven million refugees, a fifth of the country occupied, and an escalating wave of Russian missile and drone strikes against energy infrastructure since Trump returned to the White House — all paint the picture of an exhausted nation. It is weary and wounded, but no less determined than on day one. Sacrifice and determination are two sides of the same coin: Kyiv will resist until Russia’s bicycle collapses.
This is an imperial war that can be shortened or prolonged by external actors — starting with the EU, China and the US. The sanctions packages adopted by European countries against Russia, military and financial aid to Ukraine, the reception of refugees and the prospect of EU accession are all designed to strengthen the side that is resisting and weaken the aggressor.
Support for Kyiv has often been granted reluctantly. Russian assets have been frozen but rarely used. Sanctions have been incremental and frequently diluted. Europe could have done more. Yet over these four years it has maintained a strategic and moral line.
China, while reiterating its neutrality, has helped extend the conflict. Even as it has sought to restrain nuclear threats from Moscow, Beijing has provided vital support to the Russian economy, technology and indirectly to its military sector, thereby prolonging the war.
Finally, the United States. Under Trump, policy has changed radically. Joe Biden was criticised for excessive caution, which arguably favoured a war of attrition but at least supported Ukraine’s defence. Trump has taken the opposite approach. He believed he could force a swift settlement — a “men’s deal” — at Ukraine’s expense.
He has tried to accelerate the war’s end through Ukrainian defeat by withdrawing available leverage. Today, the US no longer provides military aid to Kyiv. American intelligence support remains significant but is less central than a year ago, when Europeans began filling the gap.
Trump may still believe he can pressure Volodymyr Zelenskyy and the Ukrainian people into surrendering territories Russia has failed to conquer by threatening to withdraw security guarantees.
But what credibility do security guarantees from a Trump-led United States carry? Even Article 5 of the Nato treaty — the collective defence clause — risks appearing fragile amid talk of Greenland’s annexation and transactional bilateral deals.
The paradox is striking. The only actor with the leverage to shorten the war is the US president.
Trump could pressure Moscow through tougher sanctions rather than legitimising it. Instead, he has chosen not to act, thereby prolonging the conflict and making the past year the bloodiest so far.
This war will end only with victory or defeat. By weakening Western resolve and introducing strategic ambiguity, Trump has not delivered peace. He has made an imperial war longer — and more violent.
A previous version of this article was published by the Italian daily La Stampa
IEP@BU does not express opinions of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.
