Why Hormuz Could be America’s Suez Moment
As the 1956 crisis exposed the limits of Franco-British power, the Strait of Hormuz crisis may mark the beginning of a relative decline in US influence in the Middle East. A commentary by Nathalie Tocci
Talks between Iran and the US collapsed within hours of opening in Islamabad, followed by the announcement of a US naval blockade in the Strait of Hormuz, already closed by Iran.
The fragile truce — already broken by Israel in Lebanon — could now collapse altogether. Alternatively, negotiations could resume, drag on beyond the two weeks initially envisaged, or even end in an agreement.
The three parties directly involved in the war — Israel, Iran and the US — are pulling in opposite directions, making radically different scenarios possible. Yet they all share one common denominator: the likely end of the American non-Pax in the Middle East.
Of the three countries involved in the conflict, it is Israel — and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in particular — that is pushing for a resumption of hostilities against Iran.
Israel’s real intentions were laid bare in all their obscene impunity in Lebanon, in the immediate aftermath of the US-Iran ceasefire agreement: Israel caused more than 350 Lebanese civilian deaths for the sole purpose of provoking an Iranian response in support of Hezbollah, which in turn could drag a reluctant Donald Trump back into bombing Iran.
The US naval blockade points in the same direction.
Just as Tehran transformed the conflict from a bilateral military confrontation against the US and Israel — one it would have clearly lost — into an asymmetric conflict, expanding it geographically to the Gulf states and economically to the rest of the world through the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, thereby emerging, for now, as the strategic winner, Israel is now seeking to pull Washington back into war through triangulation with Lebanon.
Were Netanyahu to succeed, the war would resume, with the US once again falling into an escalation trap set by Israel and exploited by Iran.
If that does not happen, two alternatives would open up. The first would be the resumption and prolongation of negotiations.
It is impossible to imagine that within two weeks the parties could strike a deal not only on the main issues already on the table before the conflict erupted — the nuclear programme, the missile programme, the role of pro-Iranian proxies in the region and the suspension of sanctions, starting with the release of frozen Iranian assets abroad — but also on the new issues absent from the pre-war agenda: namely the end of the war in Lebanon and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.
As matters stand, 440 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 per cent — a level for which there is no civilian application — remain in Iran; Iran’s missile programme has certainly been degraded, but it still retains the capacity to strike Israel and the Gulf states; pro-Iranian militias are weakened but not dissolved, and groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen, while acting according to their own interests rather than as mere extensions of Tehran, have intervened in support of Iran because the possible collapse of the Islamic Republic would represent an existential threat to them.
Added to all this is control of the Strait of Hormuz, which has enabled Iran to destabilise the global economy and is becoming a strategic and economic lever of extraordinary value, through a de facto toll system that is already operational.
Finally, it must be borne in mind that the Iranian regime has radicalised and is now ever more firmly in the hands of the Revolutionary Guards.
It is in no hurry to reach a deal, nor does it intend to accept cut-price compromises. More than anyone else, Tehran is probably prepared to drag negotiations on sine die.
There remains, finally, the prospect — however slim — of an agreement. Any agreement implies compromise: if one were reached, it would undoubtedly entail significant concessions from both sides.
The Americans could secure meaningful guarantees on the nuclear front, ironically not so different from those Iran had been ready to offer before the war. On the Iranian side, it is difficult to imagine a total renunciation of the strategic leverage it has acquired over the Strait.
And so, just as seventy years ago the Suez crisis — marked by Gamal Abdel Nasser’s nationalisation of the Canal — signalled the end of the Franco-British era in the Middle East, the Hormuz crisis could come to represent the twilight of the American non-Pax in the region.
A previous version of this article was published by the Italian daily La Stampa
IEP@BU does not express opinions of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.
