Why Nato Benefits Both America and Europe, Whatever Trump May Say
The alliance endures as a cornerstone of US power even as the White House casts doubt on it. A commentary by Nathalie Tocci
Donald Trump’s threats against Nato are at once empty and real. Empty because this is not the first time he has targeted Europe and the Atlantic alliance; real because, however inconsistent and often self-contradictory his rhetoric may be, it underscores a structural shift: Europe, like the countries of the Gulf, can no longer rely on the security guarantees once provided by the United States.
Trump has voiced his “disgust” and described Nato as a “paper tiger”. He has suggested that the US might withdraw from the alliance, a position echoed even by figures traditionally considered staunchly Atlanticist within his circle, such as secretary of state Marco Rubio.
The latter has argued that Washington could seriously reconsider its Nato membership in light of Europe’s reluctance to support what he frames as the legitimate war effort of the US and Israel against Iran.
On one level, these are empty threats.
Trump and his allies have repeatedly expressed scepticism towards Nato since his first administration between 2016 and 2020.
In his second presidency, beginning in 2025, he has gone further — aligning with Russian positions on Ukraine, imposing tariffs on Europe, and even threatening the annexation of Greenland.
The latter, involving the possibility of conflict between the US and Denmark, a Nato ally, constitutes a far more serious threat to the alliance than any rhetorical outburst.
Europeans may have grown accustomed to Trump’s provocations — perhaps even bored by them — but the underlying risks are anything but trivial.
In practice, however, Trump does not always follow through. In part, this is because he cannot.
Nato membership continues to enjoy broad support among both the American public and Congress, making it one of the few issues with bipartisan backing.
Indeed, at the end of 2023 Congress passed legislation preventing any president from unilaterally withdrawing from Nato without a two-thirds majority in the Senate or an act of Congress.
Approximately 76,000 US troops remain stationed in Europe, and there are no signs of an imminent large-scale withdrawal.
A further measure approved last December restricts the president’s ability to significantly reduce US military presence in Europe without a formal justification grounded in consultations with allies and an assessment by the Pentagon of the implications for national security and deterrence against Russia.
Moreover, Nato has always served American interests as much as European ones. While the alliance has provided security guarantees to Europe, it has also enabled Washington to project power.
US defence companies have enjoyed privileged access to European markets, and American military bases — particularly in southern Europe, including Italy — have supported US operations, often controversial, in the Middle East.
It is therefore no coincidence that Trump has directed particular ire at countries such as Spain, which have openly opposed the use of their bases for US-Israeli strikes against Iran.
Nor is it accidental that threats to Nato are intensifying precisely as Europeans begin to distance themselves from Washington’s war. Whereas at the outset of the Iran conflict most European governments aligned with the rhetoric of Nato secretary-general Mark Rutte, positions are now shifting towards the principled opposition articulated by Spain’s prime minister Pedro Sánchez.
Some governments do so openly, others more discreetly, but the trajectory is clear.
Yet Trump’s threats are also real. The sense of betrayal over Ukraine is tangible. While the US continues to provide military support to Kyiv, it would not be surprising if commitments — including arms sales to European countries intended for transfer to Ukraine through Nato mechanisms — were scaled back or abandoned. Nor has Washington renounced its ambitions regarding Greenland; Copenhagen and Nuuk remain fully aware of this.
There are few issues on which Trump appears consistently committed: hostility to multilateralism, including both the EU and Nato; a preference for protectionism; and an affinity for authoritarian leadership.
Europe — with its single market, liberal democracies, and commitment to integration and multilateral cooperation — finds itself at the centre of the resulting storm, embodying precisely what the US president rejects.
No degree of diplomatic flattery from European leaders will alter this reality. Gradually, capitals across the continent are beginning to acknowledge it.
The notable exception may be Nato’s secretary-general. But perhaps this, too, is unsurprising: it is often those most exposed to institutional decline who are last to recognise it.
A previous version of this article was published by the Italian daily La Stampa
IEP@BU does not express opinions of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.
