The European Council That Quietly Ended the Era of the National Veto
The December 2025 European Council may be remembered less for the failure of Germany’s plan on Russian frozen assets than for a decisive weakening of national veto power in EU foreign policy. A commentary by Daniel Gros
The December 2025 European Council may be remembered less for its headline disputes and the failure of the German plan and more for what it quietly achieved: a decisive weakening of national veto power in EU foreign policy.
For months, Germany had championed a plan to use frozen Russian assets to finance aid to Ukraine. But this was always a legally precarious second-best option, requiring elaborate protections for Belgium and carrying the risk of challenge in international courts. What ultimately emerged instead—a €90 billion support package for Ukraine financed through EU-issued bonds—is both legally sounder and strategically more important.
The breakthrough came from a surprising source. Although Hungary, Czechia, and Slovakia oppose further support to Ukraine, they chose not to block the use of the 7-year EU budget (the Multiannual Financial Framework, or MFF) to cover the interest payments on these loans. Because MFF decisions normally require unanimity, their effective abstention removed the one obstacle that could have derailed the entire package. Hungary, in other words, relinquished the veto it had long wielded as leverage on EU Ukraine support for Ukraine.
To ease the political optics, the three governments were granted an opt-out from contributing to the interest payments. Yet this concession is symbolic at best. Together these countries represent less than 4 percent of EU GDP. At current interest rates, their combined annual contribution would have been roughly €80 million—negligible compared with the approximately €9 billion per year in net transfers they receive from the EU budget. Their “savings” amount to less than 1 percent of their net receipts.
This arithmetic will not be forgotten. When negotiations for the next seven-year budget begin, the 24 other member states—especially Germany and the northern contributors—will recall that these same governments declined to shoulder even a token share of the Ukraine support effort. While Hungary and its allies cannot be excluded outright from funds earmarked for agriculture or regional development, the rules governing those allocations can be adjusted. Even a modest recalibration—say, a 5 percent reduction—would reduce Hungary’s net annual benefit by far more than the interest payments it refused to cover.
And this €90 billion package is almost certainly not the last. The next MFF will be structured to ensure that Europe can sustain Ukraine for as long as needed, with provisions designed to limit obstruction by states that remain ambivalent—or hostile—toward such support.
Another under-appreciated development came through the invocation of Article 122 to freeze Russian assets indefinitely. Previously, this asset freeze required renewal every six months by unanimous Council decision. Again, Hungary and its partners chose not to object, enabling a measure that could otherwise have blocked. Their silence allowed the EU to shift from temporary renewals to a long-term legal framework on sanctions with major geopolitical implications.
Taken together, these decisions mark a decisive shift. By choosing not to exercise the veto in two strategically critical areas, Hungary and its allies demonstrated that the costs of obstructing the will of an overwhelming majority of the EU are too high to consider. In doing so, they opened the door to a more assertive and unified European Union—one capable of acting as a geopolitical actor rather than a club hamstrung by national vetoes.
The December 2025 European Council may thus come to be seen as the beginning of the end of unanimity in EU foreign policy—and the beginning of a Europe ready to wield real geopolitical influence.
IEP@BU does not express opinions of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.
