Daniel Gros

The report on The Future of European Competitiveness presented by Mario Draghi provides a clarion call for economic reforms to stop Europe’s relative decline.  This short comment cannot do justice to the report with over 300 pages of supporting material.  We will concentrate just on two key messages regarding innovation and investment.

The mobile telecom sector is often taken as a case study of fragmentation of the single market leading to less investment and a loss of technological leadership. However, a closer examination of the data suggests that the fragmentation also implies more competition leading to lower prices for consumers in Europe.

A popular thesis in policy circles is that there is an “investment gap” that Europe needs to fill to face the great challenges of our times, such as the digital and green transitions. However, the notion of the “investment gap” used by policymakers is often vague and therefore it risks legitimate a wasteful allocation of public resources.

EU firms should be able to satisfy a large share of the increases in defence expenditure that are required immediately to support Ukraine and also those in the medium and longer-term

Imposing such high tariffs on BEVs from China without any evidence of damage to EU industry does not make sense and will only backfire on the ability of EU industry to export their own cars.

The elections for the European Parliament of June 6-9 had a clear winner, the extreme right, and also a clear loser, the economy.

Through its missions and governance, Horizon Europe does not meet the innovation challenge and anchors our industry in the mid-tech range. This report argues that current European efforts, while laudable, are insufficient, in both quantity and quality. Important reforms are required to enable Europe to compete in the value-creating space.

The pattern of macroeconomic catch-up seen in the EU’s enlargement process is a remarkably positive story - if largely unsung and still incomplete. The catch-up achieved so far constitutes a key backdrop to today’s debate about further enlargement.  Without the rapid growth of the most recently acceding states it would be impossible for the EU to contemplate taking further poor members.

A key factor that policy often overlooks is substitutability. Almost every raw material has substitutes. A combination of substitution and some stock piling would be sufficient to de-risk the supply of raw materials to a large extent.

While American and European central bankers might prefer to focus on their progress in tamping down inflation, there is no use pretending that they did not play a significant role in creating the problem.

With many new restrictive measures in place one would have expected trade to fall.  However, the most one can say is that globalisation has turned into slowbalisation. 

The EU is encouraging other countries to follow its lead and support the green transition. This requires massive subsidies in many different sectors.  Why should the EU then complain if other countries outcompete it in terms of subsidizing the production of green goods?   

L'Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), firmato dal Presidente degli Stati Uniti Joe Biden quasi un anno fa (agosto 2022), è il primo importante provvedimento per contrastare il cambiamento climatico che il parlamento degli Stati Uniti abbia mai approvato. La ragione principale di questo successo è che l’IRA non impone oneri all’industria USA ma garantisce molti sussidi.

In this Working Document, we do not try to provide an overall evaluation of the IRA or its cost-effectiveness with regard to addressing climate change and US emissions. Rather, we investigate its impact on the US market and on EU export opportunities, concentrating on the material content of the IRA – not its intention.

A detailed analysis suggests that the handicap for European producers in the US market will be limited. This small negative effect is likely to be overwhelmed by the much-increased market, implying that the IRA leads to increased opportunities for exports of electric vehicles and renewable inputs to the US. Our calculations suggest that over time the US market for electric vehicles could increase by a factor of 4 and renewables installations should also increase by hundreds of percent. A commentary by Daniel Gros.

So much international trade happens in dollars that it would be very difficult to turn the tide against the currency any time soon.

Why have energy and goods prices followed the traditional trajectory – first up, then down – but the services sector has remained plagued by inflationary pressures?

The euro area has been subject to a series of very different shocks, some of which, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, were unprecedented. While the ECB’s reaction to these deflationary shocks was vigorous, it persisted too long with its expansionary measures and failed to see their inflationary impact when energy prices shot up. The future is likely to bring new challenges, but climate change might not be the most important threat to price and financial stability.

This document was provided by the Economic Governance and EMU Scrutiny Unit at the request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) ahead of the Monetary Dialogue with the ECB President on 15 February 2024.

While American and European central bankers might prefer to focus on their progress in tamping down inflation, there is no use pretending that they did not play a significant role in creating the problem.

​​​​​​In the discussion on monetary policy in the presence of supply shocks, we focus on the Euro area to understand the recent wave of inflation.

So much international trade happens in dollars that it would be very difficult to turn the tide against the currency any time soon.

Our starting point was the stark increase in non-energy price inflation, which is the key element for the ECB since monetary policy cannot do anything about energy prices. Could the ECB have foreseen this development? Our analysis suggests that this would have been difficult based on past experience. 

Inflation rates in the euro area and US increased sharply in 2022, in part following large energy price shocks. This column analyses the pass-through from energy prices to core inflation since the 1970s for the US and Germany. It shows that this pass-through is not constant over time, but time-varying. Pass-through from energy to inflation during the 1970s was high in the US, but not in Germany. Both countries experienced high pass-through in 2022, but this has declined in the most recent quarters, consistent with a return to more normal inflation dynamics.

The US and the euro area have similar headline inflation rates, but very different drivers. In the US, inflation is mainly driven by housing costs. By contrast in the euro area energy now provides an important negative element, that is offset to a large extent by still increasing food prices

A concise introduction into the workings of large language models is presented. We start with an introduction to the attention mechanism, the core of the transformer architecture, which is then followed by a discussion of the steps needed to engineer the base model, a generatively pretrained transfromers (GPT), to a working chatbot like ChatGPT.