Europe’s Budget Deadlock Threatens Its Sovereignty

29/10/2026
The EU needs a budget that matches its ambitions on cohesion, competitiveness and defence. A smaller settlement would leave the continent more exposed
Number: 537
Year: 2026
Author(s): Marco Buti, Luca Jahier

The EU needs a budget that matches its ambitions on cohesion, competitiveness and defence. A smaller settlement would leave the continent more exposed. A commentary by Marco Buti, and Luca Jahier

buti jahier

Marco Buti will speak at the IEP Bocconi Annual Event, “At the Table or on the Menu? Europe, Middle Powers and International Order”, on 18 November 2026 in Milan. He will join the panel on technology, industrial policy and digital sovereignty.

 

In July 2025, the European Commission put forward its proposal for the next multiannual financial framework (MFF), covering 2028–2034.

Implementing the decisions underpinning the MFF takes many months: a political agreement between the Council and the European Parliament must be followed by a series of implementing legislative measures.

Time is therefore running dangerously short. After more than a year of fruitless discussions, there is still no agreement in the Council, while the European Parliament set out its negotiating position last April.

Admittedly, after decades of such negotiations, we have grown accustomed to last-minute drama and bitter exchanges between “frugal” countries and supporters of a more ambitious budget, between net contributors and net recipients, and between traditionalists and innovators.

Yet this time the deadlock looks far more serious, as we unfortunately predicted in these pages on 9 June.

We are gambling with the continent’s future. Amid systemic crises in our model of development and the rise of nationalist and authoritarian forces in Europe and elsewhere, there is a very real risk that parties championing national sovereignty will turn the European Union into a colony of outside powers.

The Commission’s proposal was already modest in financial terms, despite the impressive headline figure of €2tn in nominal terms spread over seven years. The successive rotating Council presidencies have since produced three deeply disappointing “negotiating boxes”, none of which has secured agreement.

The latest, put forward by the Irish presidency, so alienated every side that some stunned observers saw it as a deliberate provocation.

We are now waiting to see whether European Council president António Costa, fresh from a tour of national capitals, can do any better before the end of the year. Little is expected from the extraordinary meeting of leaders in late November; the real test will come just before Christmas, once parliament has gone into recess.

There is good reason for doubt, given how far apart and polarised the positions have become.

An even deeper rift than in the past has opened between the “friends” of the EU’s traditional priorities — territorial and social cohesion, the common agricultural policy, fisheries and so on — and advocates of a budget cut to the bone and focused on a handful of new priorities linked to competitiveness and defence.

The frugal countries, led by Germany, are demanding a €400bn cut that would leave the next budget substantially smaller than the current one.

The European Parliament has voted by a qualified majority for a more ambitious budget than the Commission proposed.

The European Committee of the Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee have likewise called for a more ambitious budget.

We need to recognise that the MFF confronts the EU with an existential trilemma: it cannot simultaneously protect traditional spending, principally on the common agricultural policy and cohesion funds, refuse new own resources and increase investment in European public goods, from defence and competitiveness to Europe’s global role and social solidarity. How can this trilemma be resolved?

First, by easing pressure on spending. The most obvious step would be to roll over NextGenerationEU debt as it matures, since its repayment costs amount to 0.11 per cent of EU GDP. This would also meet market demand for a greater supply of a European safe asset.

Second, by introducing new EU own resources — the Commission and parliament have tabled several proposals — thereby partly defusing the painful wrangling over national contributions that regularly holds our common future hostage.

Third, by providing for a binding review of the MFF in 2030, giving the European Parliament elected in 2029 and the incoming Commission an opportunity to exercise their democratic mandate and adjust the EU budget.

The ultimate goal should be to create a “European budgetary system” that combines EU and national budgets in pursuit of shared priorities. This would demonstrate that such vertical coordination would be both more effective and more efficient, allowing savings in national spending, above all on defence, through economies of scale and scope.

There is ample room to move beyond sterile, twentieth-century divisions, accommodate the positions of the various negotiating parties and take account of the qualified majority needed in the European Parliament to approve the final agreement.

What is needed is the courage to put the debate back in citizens’ hands, with a serious investment in grassroots participation that builds a real understanding of the added value of European action.

We need to show far greater confidence in the continent’s collective future through the resources we commit, the political priorities we choose and the participation we encourage. We might be pleasantly surprised.

Consider the joint statement by Germany’s industrial federation, trade unions and civil society organisations, which, in direct opposition to Chancellor Merz’s stance, firmly calls for a more ambitious budget with no reduction in its overall size.

It is striking that no one in Italy, whether in government or opposition, is putting this issue at the heart of an election manifesto.

Yet Italy, which is returning to growth of less than 1 per cent as NextGenerationEU comes to an end, has the most to lose from a deal that falls short. Italy’s social partners should mobilise, as their German counterparts have..

 

A previous version of this article was published by Il Sole 24 Ore

IEP Bocconi does not express opinions of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.

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