How Europe Can Lead Without Becoming a Superpower
If the EU does not learn to lead among equals, it risks becoming increasingly isolated in a world dominated by force. A commentary by Daniel Gros
The recent US attack on Iran is only the latest sign that great powers are increasingly willing to use military force with little regard for international law or established conventions.
Europe must recognise the world as it is, not as it would like it to be. In this harsher environment of raw power, how should Europe navigate both politics and economics? How can it survive between an unpredictable America and an economically dominant China?
The first step is to bring Europe’s ambitions into line with its limited resources.
Security must come first. While global attention is focused on the Gulf, Ukraine continues to fight for its survival — and, in doing so, protects the rest of Europe. This war, now in its fifth year, remains the central security threat facing the continent.
Higher defence spending should therefore be concentrated on ensuring that Europe can defend itself against any Russian aggression even without US support. This requires joint efforts to close existing capability gaps, particularly in missile defence and space. A Europe that needs American help to defend itself will never become a credible global actor.
Europe should not aspire to a global military presence. Missions in the Gulf or east Asia would distract from the core objective: securing Europe against a Russia with imperial ambitions, while preserving the fragile balance in the Mediterranean.
A crisis in the Middle East inevitably affects Europe, but European influence in the region is almost negligible. A limited contribution to a multinational force to keep the Strait of Hormuz open after the end of hostilities is all that Europe can, and should, plan for.
Economic strength and strategic vulnerability
Europe remains a global economic power. Its GDP is comparable to that of the US and China, and the EU ranks second only in international trade. Yet it is clearly the most vulnerable of the major powers.
Unlike the US, Europe depends entirely on imports to meet its energy needs, while China at least has abundant coal reserves. Europe is also weak in many frontier technologies. Artificial intelligence is a telling example: European researchers make a significant contribution to academic research, but European companies are almost absent from the commercial development of AI. The only relevant European player, Mistral, remains a mid-sized competitor.
The combination of a large economy, strong trade performance and solid research capacity forms the basis of European soft power. But these assets must be leveraged through alliances with like-minded middle powers — such as Canada, Australia, Japan and, closer to home, the UK — that can help reduce Europe’s vulnerabilities.
Several countries have already expressed interest in becoming associated members of the EU’s research framework programme. The creation of a global research alliance would help Europe regain ground in areas where it is weakest, such as semiconductor manufacturing and space.
A further advantage of such an alliance would be to reduce Europe’s dependence on large US technology platforms, which pose a security risk because they are ultimately subject to the authority of the American administration.
The objective should not be to create EU-controlled alternatives, but to develop shared solutions with other countries, possibly open source, so that no single actor can exercise exclusive control. All participants would benefit, and the market for these alternatives would be much larger.
The main obstacle to this approach is Brussels’ arrogance. The EU is much larger than each of its like-minded partners, and this leads European officials to believe they can dictate the terms of participation and governance in common initiatives.
Trade and Europe’s global role
Trade is the EU’s main strength. Donald Trump’s assault on global trade has largely failed: the US trade deficit has not improved, world trade has expanded, and the cost of tariffs has been borne mainly by American importers. This confirms once again that protectionism is largely self-defeating.
Last summer’s trade agreement with the US was widely criticised as a capitulation. Yet exercising “power” through retaliation at that moment would have served little purpose. In effect, the EU allowed the US to damage itself.
There are better ways to support the rules-based global order. One example would be to take the lead in strengthening an agreement among 66 countries on an alternative dispute-settlement mechanism. But this can work only if the EU refrains from using trade defence instruments for political purposes.
Europe should not seek to be, or to become, a superpower. It should instead aim to lead a global coalition of democratic middle powers. By strengthening the security of its own borders against Russia and pooling its weight in research and trade with like-minded partners from London to Tokyo, the EU can escape the trap of US-China rivalry.
But this requires Brussels to abandon its tendency to impose conditions on smaller partners and embrace a new spirit of genuine co-operation.
If Europe does not learn to lead among equals, it risks becoming increasingly isolated in a world dominated by force.
This article was originally published in Sarfatti 25, The Bocconi University Magazine
IEP@BU does not express opinions of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.
