Looking Beyond the Backlog: A Fairer View of the NRRP’s Impact on Italy’s Courts
The latest data on Italy’s courts suggest that the NRRP has delivered more measurable progress than its critics acknowledge. A commentary by Gian Luigi Gatta
In a recent paper published by the Institute for European Policymaking at Bocconi University, two distinguished economists, Tito Boeri and Roberto Perotti, offer a detailed and thought-provoking critical evaluation of Italy’s National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP).
According to the authors, for a number of well-argued reasons Italy — the largest recipient of the Next Generation EU funding — risks reaching the end of the NRRP cycle this year “more indebted than before, without having solved its structural weaknesses.”
Among the principal criticisms directed both at the Italian government — or, more precisely, at the successive governments that have been in office since 2020 (led by Giuseppe Conte, Mario Draghi and Giorgia Meloni) — and at the European Commission are the following: an approach driven more by the objective of securing and spending substantial financial resources than by coherent strategic planning; design flaws within a plan whose complexity appears excessive even when measured against the time horizon for implementation; insufficient transparency in the communication of the data necessary for effective monitoring; and the adoption of unrealistic targets, frequently revised downwards during implementation, with the result that outcomes which might otherwise be regarded as unsatisfactory can ultimately be presented as successes.
The paper concludes with a pars construens that looks to the future and advances methodological reflections of clear interest for policymakers. Yet its analytical core undoubtedly lies in a markedly critical appraisal of the Italian NRRP, first developed in general terms and subsequently tested through five case studies: the justice system, the education system, early childhood services, student housing, and labour-market reform.
As a legal scholar, my attention was naturally drawn to the first case study, which the authors consider particularly emblematic in supporting their overall argument.
My impression—supported by the most recent statistical monitoring data on NRRP indicators (first half of 2025) published by the Italian Ministry of Justice—is that this critical assessment is shaped by a highly selective use of the available evidence. Those familiar with the trajectory of NRRP implementation in the justice sector can hardly avoid the impression that the analysis relies on a form of cherry picking.
Boeri and Perotti focus their analysis essentially on a single objective of the NRRP in the justice sector: the reduction of the backlog in civil proceedings (by 90% compared with 2019). They argue that this confirms their broader thesis, namely that unrealistic targets were initially established and later revised during the course of implementation, with a downward adjustment as the 2026 deadline of the plan approaches.
However, the most recent data published by the Ministry of Justice—if considered in their entirety, that is, with reference to objectives other than and in addition to the reduction of the civil backlog—contradict the claim advanced in the paper that “all quantitative measures of the efficiency of the justice system worsen during the NRRP years.”
According to Boeri and Perotti, “the interventions in the justice system do not seem to have yielded results so far in terms of measurable outcomes.” While such a statement may hold with regard to the objective of reducing the civil backlog, which has indeed proved excessively ambitious, it is certainly not borne out with respect to other, equally significant indicators of judicial efficiency that are explicitly included in the NRRP.
Let us begin with criminal proceedings. The target agreed with the European Commission—never subsequently modified—was a 25% reduction in disposition time (not 28%, as reported in the paper), an indicator widely used internationally to measure the average duration of judicial proceedings.
In the criminal sector, the data for the first half of 2025 continue to show an overall improvement compared with the 2019 baseline, with a reduction in disposition time across the three levels of jurisdiction amounting to -37.8%, thus substantially exceeding the reduction required by the NRRP target.
The improvement is visible at every stage of the proceedings: -20.1% at first instance, -43.0% in the courts of appeal, and -53.6% before the Supreme Court of Cassation of Italy. In certain jurisdictions, such as Naples, the results are even more striking: the disposition time for criminal appeals has fallen by 84%, from 2,031 days (roughly five and a half years) to 324 days (less than one year).
Turning to civil proceedings, the target of a 40% reduction in disposition time (not 56%, as indicated in the paper) has not yet been achieved, but it is by no means out of reach. Data for the first half of 2025 show the following reductions relative to the 2019 baseline: -27.8% in overall disposition time, including declines of -17.6% in first-instance courts, -28.5% in the courts of appeal, and -31.7% in the Court of Cassation.
Also, the reduction in the civil backlog has been substantial and deserves recognition. According to data from the Ministry of Justice, between 2022 and the first half of 2025, more than 1.5 million cases were cleared in the lower courts and more than 260,000 in the courts of appeal, to the benefit of citizens and companies who, without the NRRP, would probably still be waiting for a response from the justice system.
These figures can hardly be disregarded in any balanced overall assessment without risking a portrayal that is both incomplete and, at the very least, unfair.
The justice system has undergone considerable efforts and transformations: not only through the reforms of criminal and civil procedure carried out under the then Justice Minister, Professor Marta Cartabia—reforms that have subsequently been adjusted, implemented and monitored for more than three years by the government led by Giorgia Meloni—but also through the reorganization of work within the judiciary and the judicial offices themselves.
Reducing the average duration of criminal and civil proceedings by more than one third and more than one quarter, respectively, compared with 2019 constitutes a historically significant achievement that deserves to be acknowledged, including by those who work within the justice system itself—judges, administrative staff, and the young professionals recruited with NRRP funding as part of the Ufficio per il processo to assist judges in their work.
It is no coincidence that, in their January speeches opening the judicial year, senior figures in the judiciary highlighted the positive results achieved in implementing the NRRP. A case in point is the report by Pietro Gaeta, Attorney General at the Court of Cassation, according to whom, thanks to the NRRP, “unthinkable efficiency targets” have been achieved in the justice system.
In my view, it is important to stress that such assessments carry particular weight for at least two reasons: first, because they originate from practitioners working within the judiciary; and second, because they are independent of the government’s own evaluations.
The risk of failing to acknowledge what has been achieved under the impetus of the NRRP is that it may fuel an unwarranted loss of confidence in the justice system by overlooking the progress that—albeit with difficulty and not without challenges—has been made in recent years.
On the other hand, the NRRP has, for the first time, planted the seeds of a new culture of efficiency in the justice system, based on statistical data and the achievement of quantitative targets. This culture must not be lost and will perhaps be one of the most important legacies of the NRRP in the justice sector.
This commentary is part of a broader discussion offering an initial assessment of the impact and policy implications of the Next Generation EU programme as it nears completion. The conversation was opened by a Policy Brief by Tito Boeri and Roberto Perotti, An Evaluation of the Italian National Recovery and Resilience Plan.
IEP@BU does not express opinions of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.
