More Europe in Defence: Three Pathways

A report by a task force including CEPS, Clingendael, RUSI and IEP Bocconi. Chair: Sauli Niinistö; Rapporteur: Steven Blockmans; Contributors: Edward Arnold, Bob Deen, Daniel Gros

Executive Summary 

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and destabilising actions by the second Trump administration have sent geopolitics into a tailspin. As turmoil in the Middle East and around the world grows, the US is reviewing its approach to NATO and is considering deploying its assets away from Europe. These and other factors have pushed Europe towards an inflection point in considering how to safeguard its own security. 

Public support for defence has never been greater. This solidifies a trend that has accelerated since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Most political parties across Europe agree on the need to address public anxiety by moving from words to deeds and implementing an agenda that gives them more security and agency in the defence of the European theatre by 2030. 

The European policy response so far has consisted primarily of committing more money to defence at the national level and developing instruments to boost joint production and procurement mostly at the EU level. Yet concerns remain about the uneven nature of defence spending, countries’ ability to follow through on the needed capability ramp-ups and the limitations of existing measures for driving the needed defragmentation of Europe’s defence industry. 

Meanwhile, concerns have grown about the possibility of a Russian kinetic or hybrid attack against one or more European allies, along with uncertainties about public willingness to take up arms. So too have doubts about the timing and nature of support that the US would be willing or able to provide in an Article 5 situation. Despite the return of full-scale war on the European continent with Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine, Europe still appears to be treating this existential security crisis like a regular bureaucratic undertaking that it can address at its leisure. 

It is at this critical juncture that CEPS, RUSI, Clingendael and IEP have joined forces to substantiate what politicians often casually refer to as a European pillar of NATO – though few can say what this means in practice or whether it would offer a credible deterrent. This report outlines three possible pathways to shore up Europe’s defences: a more European NATO; a new European multilateralism; and EU-led defence cooperation. 

The report argues that European policymakers are at present in no position to discard any of these options. But given the lack of viable alternatives to NATO as well as dependencies on American arms manufacturers, software and strategic enablers until at least the end of the decade, the report recommends that Europeans continue with the Europeanisation of NATO as a matter of priority (Pathway 1). This would rebalance the transatlantic contribution to the Alliance and enable them to take it over if the US were to leave NATO. This effort should consist not just of Europeans gradually assuming leadership positions from US generals and replacing American officers at lower levels. It should also entail reconstituting the ‘Eurogroup’ for political coordination within the Alliance. A geographical redistribution of joint command centres should be explored so they could be led and operated by European allies should the US decide to be less or no longer involved. 

Pathway 2 – a new European multilateralism – provides additional means for preparation and action by subsets of allies should the US, or any other ally, render NATO dysfunctional from within, for example by slow-rolling or blocking political decision-making or frustrating operational command in an Article 5 situation. Europeans should already be taking steps to strengthen, connect and consolidate existing minilateral arrangements for security and considering how they could be knitted together into a more coherent whole. 

Enhanced minilateralism should include a political consultation and decision-making body akin to NATO’s North Atlantic Council, such as a European Security Council (ESC), to enable a coalition of the willing to act1. Such an ESC should include the secretary general of NATO and presidents of the European Council and Commission, each acting within their own prerogatives. This ESC would have to be supported by the appropriate command structures, operational capacities and dedicated budget. Placing such a body for European security on the footing of an intergovernmental agreement would connect decision-making to a national democratic backstop that works for a membership of both militarily powerful and less powerful European states. 

Pathway 3 concerns EU-led defence cooperation. In terms of capability development, the EU has a comparative advantage in supporting not just those 23 Member States allied to NATO, but also its associated, candidate and like-minded countries (e.g. Norway, Ukraine and the UK) in translating defence spending targets into concrete investments and deployable military assets. Obstacles preventing NATO and the EU from creating maximum synergies in capability development should be removed. Furthermore, NATO should share the necessary information with the corresponding EU structures. 

For its part, the EU should rebalance defence industrial relationships with the UK and other non-EU members of NATO to serve mutual strategic interests. This entails, among others, opening up the EU’s loan instrument, Security for Action in Europe (SAFE), to a wider group of like-minded countries, such as the UK, to finance priority capabilities; accelerating the integration of Ukraine’s defence industry into the single market; and instilling more reciprocity in the transatlantic industrial alliance. 

EU Treaty reform is not on the cards anytime soon. Progress towards a genuine European Defence Union will therefore be incremental and partial. Priority should nevertheless be given to operationalising the EU’s mutual defence clause within the present institutional configuration. Existing command structures and EU force packages should be readied accordingly to supplement tasks performed by national armies. 

IEP@BU does not express opinions of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.

If you want to stay up-to-date with the initiative of the Institute for European Policymaking@Bocconi University, subscribe to our monthly NEWSLETTER here.