Policy Brief - Valuing European Military Support to Ukraine
The economic value of EU military aid already provided and in the pipeline is substantially lower than official figures suggest. A Policy Brief by Daniel Gros, Giorgio Presidente, and Thomas Rowley
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Abstract
We use a bottom-up approach to estimate the economic value of military aid to Ukraine. We find that by mid-2026, realized military aid from EU member states amounted to €26.4 billion, with a further €18.4 billion in the pipeline.
The combined €44.8 billion represents just 58% of the €77 billion in military support officially reported by the EU and 55% of the €81.3 billion in military allocations recorded by the Kiel Ukraine Support Tracker.
The large difference with our estimate primarily reflects overlapping announcements, commitments that have not been implemented, imprecise valuations or interpretation of what equipment was transferred, and the values applied to aging stockpiles.
Using item- and system-specific reference prices while prioritizing the most recent refurbishment or contracted values, we estimate realized EU military aid at €37.7 billion before applying any remaining straight-line depreciation to the portion that is from existing stockpiles, yielding €26.4 billion.
Extending the analysis to all non-US donors, including the United Kingdom, Norway, and Canada, brings total realized military aid to €38.1 billion, with a further €22.3 billion in the pipeline.
Strikingly, realized non-US military aid declined in 2025, precisely when the reduction in new US assistance made a rapid European response more urgent. Combined realized and pipeline support nevertheless increased sharply, highlighting Europe’s difficulty translating its response to this security shock into timely military assistance.
Our research provides strong evidence that the official figures overstate the economic value of the military support provided to Ukraine and suggest that much more would have been possible without straining public finances or military readiness.
Introduction
Supporting Ukraine in its defense against Russia is a major European policy priority. The EU has committed substantial financing, including a €90 billion loan for Ukraine’s budgetary needs and defense procurement in 2026–2027.
Europe’s initial response to this extraordinary security shock, however, required member states to draw urgently on their limited military inventories while mobilizing industrial capacity to supply additional aid. We assess the scale and timeliness of European military aid to Ukraine through a bottom-up valuation of donor contributions through mid-2026.
We estimate the economic value of military aid already provided by EU member states, directly or through partners, at €26.4 billion (realized aid).
This includes equipment assessed as delivered, military funding already executed (including contributions to weapons-acquisition programs specifically intended for Ukraine), and military training.
Our estimate amounts to just 34% of the €77 billion in military support reported by the EU and its member states on July 1, 2026. A similar gap between headline figures and economic valuations emerges for the United States, where Fedyk et al. (2025) estimate military aid delivered through 2024 at $21.1 billion, or 30% of the $70.4 billion announced, although the periods and accounting definitions differ.
We attribute a further €18.4 billion to EU member states’ aid in the pipeline: sufficiently firm commitments backed by specific government decisions, procurement plans, contracts, or credible reports of implementation underway, but not yet counted as realized aid. Together, realized and pipeline aid amount to €44.8 billion, or approximately 58% of the EU’s reported total.
Reliable accounting is essential to assessing Europe’s response. While US reporting also suffers from gaps and inconsistencies, European military assistance must be reconstructed across more than two dozen national systems with differing disclosure practices and valuation conventions.
Official military-aid figures often combine overlapping announcements, commitments, and deliveries, while basing aid totals on replacement and military rebuilding costs that can far exceed the economic value of equipment transferred to Ukraine.
Such figures risk masking consequential delays and shortfalls in Europe’s response. Depreciation of stockpile transfers alone reduces our estimate by €11.3 billion, revealing how heavily Europe’s military assistance has relied on sending aging equipment to Ukraine, including systems dating back decades.
Germany is the largest EU donor, with about €6 billion in realized aid and €9 billion in the pipeline. Including the pipeline Denmark provided the largest aid relative to cumulative GDP over 2022–2025, 0.4%, compared with Germany’s less than 0.1%. Northern European and Baltic countries are also major contributors, with an order of magnitude lower figures for France (0.01%), Spain (0.008%), and Italy (0.004%).
Across all non-US donors, including the United Kingdom, Norway, and Canada, we estimate €38.1 billion in realized aid and €22.3 billion in the pipeline, totaling €60.4 billion.
As stockpile transfers declined, procurement and weapon-acquisition programs expanded. Strikingly, realized non-US military aid fell in 2025, precisely when the reduction in new US assistance made a rapid European response more urgent.
Combined realized and pipeline support nevertheless increased sharply, highlighting Europe’s difficulty translating its response to this security shock into timely military assistance.
Economic value should not be confused with military effectiveness. Older equipment can remain highly useful to Ukraine, particularly when it can be deployed immediately using existing training, ammunition, and maintenance capabilities.
IEP Bocconi does not express opinions of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.
