The US, China and the Kindleberger Trap
A de facto G2 may avert the Thucydides Trap only to push the world into a different danger: a vacuum of leadership. A commentary by Moreno Bertoldi, and Marco Buti
“Can China and the United States overcome the Thucydides Trap and create a new paradigm for relations between great powers?” The question posed by Xi Jinping in his opening speech at the summit with Donald Trump caught the attention of many commentators.
The Thucydides Trap refers to the possible inevitability of conflict between a dominant power — Sparta, or the United States — and a rising power — Athens, or China.
To avoid that trap and avert such a conflict, Xi proposed to Trump during the summit a relationship of “constructive strategic stability” between the two superpowers, skilfully combining elements of co-operation and competition.
Yet in the same speech, Xi Jinping also invoked another important concept, one that passed almost unnoticed: “A transformation unseen in a century is accelerating across the world, and the international situation is fluid and turbulent.”
Xi often uses this concept in his speeches to highlight the decline of the long-standing hegemonic role played by the United States and, in parallel, the rise of China, since “time and momentum are on our side”.
It is therefore worth noting that Xi mentioned — albeit obliquely, but not accidentally — the ongoing shift in the balance of power between the two superpowers.
For China, Trump presents both a risk and an opportunity. On the one hand, Trump is the first American president to have adopted a strongly anti-Chinese rhetoric, launched sweeping trade wars against the Asian giant and, on national security grounds, introduced significant restrictions on exports of American technology to China.
He is also the president who, more recently, has sought to impose regime change in three countries — Venezuela, Iran and Cuba — with which China has close political and economic ties.
Finally, the war in the Middle East and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz have created an economically costly situation for China, both because of the increase in energy prices and because the slowdown in the global economy risks limiting outlets for Chinese exports at a time of weak domestic demand.
All these elements would seem to tilt the balance in favour of a firmer and more confrontational Chinese approach towards the American administration.
On the other hand, Trump 2.0 offers Beijing a strategic opportunity, because it is accelerating the “transformation unseen in a century”. His erratic policies are in fact undermining the alliances that, since the end of the second world war, had strengthened and consolidated US global hegemony.
As a result, while from a tactical point of view the Trump presidency presents considerable headaches for the Chinese leadership, from a strategic point of view it is moving in the direction Beijing desires.
For China’s leaders, the task is therefore to walk a narrow path that allows them to manage the political and economic conflicts under way while avoiding the ruin of the parties involved.
Hence Xi’s proposal to create with the United States a form of “constructive strategic stability”, in order to circumvent the Thucydides Trap while enabling China to continue its rise.
The fact that the United States and China are acting as a G2 may perhaps avoid the Thucydides Trap, but it risks pushing us into the “Kindleberger Trap”: global chaos caused by the absence of a hegemonic power or, alternatively, of a broad grouping of countries capable of providing global public goods such as security, the climate transition, financial stability and a rules-based multilateral system.
Trump, with “America First”, aims at the vassalisation of his allies and, more generally, at extracting economic resources from the rest of the world.
Xi, for his part, is counting precisely on these strategic mistakes by the United States to accelerate the transformation of the world order, strengthening China’s role as a superpower that creates dependencies.
Neither of the two superpowers is ready to shoulder the burden of providing global commons. Europe, if it promotes the formation of new coalitions among middle powers, can play a stabilising role that, in the medium term, rebuilds shared governance.
Or, if it fails to do so, it will deepen the power vacuum at the heart of the global economy — while becoming its first victim.
A previous version of this article was published by Il Sole 24 Ore
IEP@BU does not express opinions of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.
