Jean Monnet was wrong
Not every crisis makes Europe stronger and more united, as the EU’s reaction to the second Trump administration shows
Over the past two decades, the European Union has weathered a succession of severe crises: from the sovereign debt turmoil to the pandemic, from wars on its borders to ruptures in its relationship with Washington under Donald Trump’s second administration.
Jean Monnet once predicted that such negative shocks would inevitably push the Union towards deeper political as well as economic integration. In a book a few years ago, one of us (Buti) questioned whether Monnet’s prophecy still held true. Today, doubts are even stronger: since 2021, European integration has stalled and hopes for a paradigm shift have not materialised. The key question is why — and what can be done.
One explanation lies in the nature of crises. When shocks are exogenous and symmetric, the EU tends to mount a collective, centralised response, as shown by the launch of NextGenerationEU in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak. By contrast, crises rooted in national failings and producing asymmetric effects are less conducive to joint action.
Thus, the sovereign debt crisis of the 2010s — triggered by Greece’s falsified public accounts — did not promote cooperation but instead entrenched the mantra of “homework first” and led to harsher fiscal rules (the Fiscal Compact). Only the imminent threat of eurozone collapse forced progress on banking union and elicited Mario Draghi’s famous “whatever it takes”.
This explanation, however, is less convincing for the current “Putin-Trump” crisis. These shocks do not stem from domestic mismanagement within member states, and their existential implications should have spurred deeper integration. Yet, after a few encouraging signals, diverging risk perceptions have fuelled national egoisms.
The EU is trying to build a common defence policy, but rising military spending remains largely national. Rather than cementing the vertical integration of national fiscal policies with a permanent central fiscal capacity, NextGenerationEU has become the oxymoron of a “temporary Hamiltonian moment”.
The Draghi report on competitiveness and the Letta report on the single market produced a “compass” of promising initiatives — but without common funding. The Commission’s recent proposal for a multiannual budget incorporates some innovations but is too small in scale and sidelines centralised debt issuance and the provision of European public goods. Meanwhile, Trump’s challenge to Europe’s productive model has been met with passive acceptance of disproportionate tariffs and other commitments that undermine EU strategic autonomy.
This regression, which flatly contradicts Monnet’s dictum, is largely explained by today’s political balance of power within the EU. The European Council, Parliament and Commission are composed in ways that inhibit a pro-European agenda, while an increasing number of member states are run by nationalist coalitions.
In such a setting, even severe crises are not enough to overcome the gravitational pull of domestic politics. In the past, crises pushed the EU to cross “red lines” once thought insurmountable — though often leaving the boldest projects unfinished once the danger passed (as with banking supervision or central fiscal capacity). Today, the European perspective is stifled from the outset.
The lesson is clear: economic necessity does not equate to political feasibility. Not only has the shared vision that 40 years ago made the single market and euro possible evaporated; but the recent spirit of cooperation that helped Europe overcome the pandemic has also faded.
In the Manifesto for Europe we promoted almost two years ago, we argued that nationalism and national interest are antithetical. Today, however, sovereignty-first politics and subordination to Trump point in the opposite direction.
Does this mark the end of European integration? We do not think so. But it is evident that political conditions are not ripe for bold institutional innovation grounded in explicit sovereignty-sharing. Instead, Europe must act in less visible ways.
To borrow Olivier Blanchard’s metaphor during the pandemic, it is time to play the plumber — to ensure the “dynamic maintenance” of pipes and connections, which, though often overlooked, are vital to the functioning of an integrated economy.
Economically, the Commission must use the full powers granted by the Treaty to remove obstacles to the single market and to press ahead with banking and financial integration. These safeguards will protect the foundations of Europe’s economy and, when political conditions allow, provide the platform for renewed, more ambitious integration.
A version of this article appeared in Italian in Il Sole 24 Ore.
IEP@BU does not express opinions of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.
